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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
While foreign banking in the United States during the
past twenty years has had tremendous opportunities, the
legislation governing this area has also been changed
dramatically. Foreign banks in the U.S. experienced
different stages along with the changing of the legislation.
This thesis on U.S. foreign banking legislation is divided
into seven chapters. Chapter I introduces the basic
concepts of foreign banking in the U.S. and presents the
basic forms in which foreign banks can do businesses in the
U.S. Chapter II examines the International Banking Act of
1978, the first federal level legislation governing foreign
banking activities in the U.S. banking history. This
chapter gives a retrospective view of foreign banking
legislation before the legislation, analyzes the reasons for
adopting the act, and examines the major provisions of the
act. Chapter III examines the Foreign Bank Supervision
Enhancement Act of 1991, a legislative reaction to several
foreign bank scandals in the U.S. Chapter IV scrutinizes
the legislation subsequent to the Foreign Bank Supervision
Enhancement Act of 1991 which affects the foreign banking
activities in the U.S. Chapter V examines the Daiwa affair,
the problems raised by Daiwa affair and U.S. reaction,
especially the legislature's reaction. Chapter VI offers
some analysis and comments on the current U.S. foreign
banking legislation. Chapter VII concludes that the U.S.
needs to open its door widely to the foreign banking.
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A. History of Foreign Banking in the U.S.
Foreign banks have been present in the United States
since 1818, when the Bank of Montreal established a New York
agency.^ From 1875 to World War II, 27 foreign banks from 12
countries, principally Britain, Canada, Hong Kong, and
Switzerland, established their U.S. banking presence.'^ The
principal businesses in this era were trade finance, funds
transfers, and participation in U.S. stock and bond
markets.^ From the end of World War II to about 1970, 48
more banks from 18 countries, including 12 of Japan's major
banks, opened their U.S. offices." Their major objective was
to secure stable funding for U.S. dollars, finance trade,
service firms from their home countries, and seek new
opportunities in U.S. financial centers.^ However, the
growth in the number and assets of foreign banking offices
in the U.S. did not take off until the late 1970s; between
1975 and 1980 their number nearly doubled.^
3
^ Connie M. Friesen & David Nissenbaum, Foreign Banks: Use
of Alternative Structures-Part I, THE REVIEW OF BANKING AND
FINANCIAL SERVICE, Nov. 15, 1995, at 1, available in LEXIS,
Banking Library, Curfews File.
^ Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
" Id.
^ Webb, Big Banks Increase Share of Growing Asset Pie,
Thomson's International Banking Regulator Special Report:
Foreign Bank Assets as of Dec. 31, 1994, at 1 [supplement to
International Banking Regulator ("IBR") (June 12, 1995)
.
^ Linda M Aguilar, A Current Look at Foreign Banking in the
U.S. and Seventh District, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, Jan. /Feb.
B. Recent Trends of Foreign Banking in the U.S.
It was in the 1970s, after foreign companies expanded
their U.S. business and international financial markets
developed, that more than three-quarters of the foreign
banks now operating in the U.S. began opening U.S. offices,
usually in New York.^ By the 1970s, foreign industries were
recovering from wartime devastation, and international trade
and investment were on the rise.*^ The U.S. dollar had
become the major international currency, and the Japanese
yen and major European currencies were appreciating.^ Such
great expansion in foreign banking was made possible by a
regulatory and political climate that welcomed foreign
banks . ^°
In 1980, the total combined foreign presence in the
U.S. banking market consisted of 441 offices with assets of
$ 252 billion dollars. "^"^ Foreign branches and agencies
accounted for the bulk of these numbers, with 334 offices or
75 percent of the total foreign offices, and 60 percent of
the assets. ^^ The remaining offices were U.S. subsidiaries
1995, at 3, available in LEXIS, Banking Library. Curfews
File.
^ Cho, Krishnan, and Nigh, The State of Foreign Banking
Presence in the United States, 5 Journal of Bank Marketing
59,60,62 (No. 2, 1987) [hereinafter "Cho"].
^ Id. at 63.
' Id.
10 Id. at 62-63
^^ Aguilar, supra note 6, at 3
.
12 Id.
of foreign banks with assets of $ 103 billion. ^'^ As of June
30, 1987, foreign bank assets in the U.S. totaled $ 571.9
billion, deposits of $ 314 billion, commercial and
industrial ("C&I") loans of $ 138.5 billion. ^^
Approximately 262 foreign banks from 58 countries had a
banking presence in the U.S.^^ By 1991, the total number
of foreign banking offices in the U.S. reached 726.-^^ Since
then, the total number of foreign bank offices has dropped
to 652 in mid-1994. ^^ However, this decline is not unique
to foreign banking offices, as the total number of U.S.-
owned commercial banks also dropped over the period. "^^
Foreign banks still have a significant presence in the
United States and play an important role in the U.S. current
economy. By the end of 1994, there were more than 370
foreign banks from 67 countries operating over 900 branches,
agencies, representative offices, or commercial bank
subsidiaries in the United States. '^^ They held over $ 900
million in assets, account for 17 percent of all lending and
'' Id.
^^ Ted Obrzut & Lynn Stofan, United States Bank Regulation
of International Banking Activities, 470 PLI/Comm 647, 649
(1988) .
15
16
17
18
19
Id. at 649.
Aguilar, supra note 6^ at 3
Id.
Id.
Webb, supra note 5, at 1
.
one-third of all C&I lending, and employ over 100,000 people
across the United States.^"
C. Forms of Foreign Bank Presences
Foreign banks can enter the United States financial
market through a variety of corporate forms, the most common
forms are branches, agencies, representative offices and
subsidiaries.^^ Edge Act corporations ("Edge corporations",
discussed below) are also one form of organization. Each of
these forms has advantages and disadvantages, and no one
form is appropriate for all banks.
1. Branches and Agencies
A branch or agency of a foreign bank has no assets that
are independent of the foreign bank parent. Branches and
agencies are not separately capitalized, free-standing legal
entities. Branches have a greater range of banking powers
than agencies or representative offices. A "branch" is
empowered to receive deposits, make loans, and generally
undertake banking functions. However, an agency, unlike a
^° Foreign Banks' Market Share: Large But Stable, Thomson's
International Banking Regulator (Feb. 20, 1995) 5. Foreign
banks' share of C&I loans including loans booked off-shore
is close to half.
^^ In addition to these four forms, a foreign bank can seek
regulatory approval to establish a commercial lending
company. This is an organization other than a bank that is
organized under state law. Like an agency, it can maintain
credit balances and make commercial loans. 12 C.F.R. s
211.22(f). Collectively, all of these forms except a
subsidiary are referred to as "offices." 12 C.F.R. s
211.22(r) (1993). See also Regulation for Foreign Banks:
Hearing before House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs, 102d Conga., 1st Sees. 92 (June 11, 1991) (prepared
text of Vincent Colon, Acting Superintendent of Banking, New
York State Banking Department, discussing New York
investment companies)
.
branch, cannot take deposits, it must fund its operations
from other sources. Agencies have three principal sources
of funds: borrowing from the parent banking organization,
borrowing in the interbank market (i.e., from other banks),
and borrowing through money market transactions (e.g.,
issuing short-term certificates of deposit, entering into
overnight repurchase agreement, etc.).^^
2. Subsidiaries
A subsidiary bank is an independently capitalized,
separate legal entity established under the auspices of the
law of the state in which it is incorporated. A subsidiary
bank owned by a foreign bank parent has all of the same
legal rights and obligations of a subsidiary bank owned by a
U.S. bank holding company. This is a manifestation of the
policy of national treatment (discussed below) , reflected in
the International Banking Act of 1978 (''IBA'') , whereby
foreign and domestic banks are treated in a substantively
equal manner.
A foreign bank can set up a subsidiary bank in either
one of the following two ways: First, it can acquire an
existing bank. Second, it can incorporate a new subsidiary
bank de novo, which needs prior approval from the relevant
authority. Specifically, a foreign bank subsidiary must
have at least 25 percent of its shares owned by the parent
foreign bank or foreign banking organization, or be
^^ Regulation of Foreign Banks: Hearing before House Comiti,
on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 102d Conga., 1st
Sees. 91 (June 11, 1991) (prepared text of Vincent Colon,
Acting Superintendent of Banking, New York State Banking
Department)
.
otherwise controlled or capable of being controlled by the
parent ."
3. Representative Offices
A ''representative office" is anything other than a
branch, agency, or subsidiary. Like a branch or agency, and
unlike a subsidiary, it is part of the parent foreign bank,
not a separately capitalized and distinct legal entity. Its
business activities are tightly restricted by regulation.
In particular, it cannot perform any major banking functions
such as taking deposits, maintaining credit balances,
extending loans, providing payments services, or making
business decisions for the foreign bank it represents . ^^ In
effect, it is purely a marketing and logistical support
office. Typically, it is engaged in soliciting new business,
generating loans booked in affiliated agencies, branches, or
subsidiaries, and serving as a liaison between the parent
foreign bank and correspondent banks.
" 12 C.F.R. s 211.22 (w) (1993) .
24 12 C.F.R. s 211.22 (u) (1993) .
CHAPTER II. THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING ACT OF 1978
A. Before the IBA
Before the passage of the IBA, as briefly discussed
before, in the 1970s, an increasing number of foreign banks
entered into the U.S. banking market. The federal
government did not charter foreign banks. ^^ Foreign banks,
however, were chartered by different individual state. ^^ It
means that foreign banks and their U.S. branches and
agencies were not controlled by the federal government, but
were regulated by individual state. This cause a different
treatment from state to state.
There were a few significant restrictions of federal
banking laws and regulations applied to foreign banks. The
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended (BHCA),^^
prohibited a foreign bank (as a bank holding company) from
directly or indirectly owning or controlling any commercial
enterprise, including a securities operation, engaging in
activities not "closely related" to banking."^ According to
the Glass-Steagall Act, a subsidiary of a foreign bank could
not engage in underwriting, selling, or distributing
^^ Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Conniver, 715 F
2d 604, 606 (D.C. Cirri. 1983), cert, denied, 466 U.S. 927
(1984) [hereinafter Conniver] (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 910,
95th Conga., 2d Sees. 5 (1978)).
^' Id.
^"^ 12 U.S.C. Ss 1841-1849 (1982).
^^ 12 U.S.C s 1843 (1982) .
securities in the United States, directly or through
affiliates or subsidiaries.^^ Under the BHCA, there was a
prohibition on a foreign bank's establishing or acquiring
other bank subsidiaries in other states, except as expressly
permitted by state law.^^ However, in general, foreign
banks and their branches and agencies were not subjected to
many federal banking laws and regulations which place
restrictions and prohibitions (such as reserve requirements,
deposit insurance requirements) upon the operation of
domestic banks and bank holding companies ( ^BHC ) . ^^ This
gave foreign banks a considerable advantage over their U.S.
domestic counterparts.
As the rapid growth of the foreign banks' U.S.
operations. Congress became anxious that the lack of federal
supervision over foreign banks increased the potential
impact of an unscrupulous foreign bank practicing illegal or
unsound banking methods in the domestic banking market. "^^
In addition. Congress was concerned that such lack of
uniform regulations could cause inadequate supervision over
international flows^^ and the functioning of U.S. money and
^^ 12 U.S.C. ss4 (Seventh), 78, 377, 378 (1982 & Sup. IV
1986)
.
^° 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (d) (1982).
31 Obrzut & Stofan, supra note 14, at 649
32 John L. Carr, Jr. & John H. More, Developments in the
Regulation of Foreign Bank Operations in the United States,
1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 225, 230 (1988) (discussing Congress'
concern with foreign bank avoidance of banking restrictions
applicable to domestic banks)
.
^^ International Banking Act of 1977: Hearings Before the
Subcomm, on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation,
10
credit market.'^'' It was in 1978 when Congress enacted the
IBA that U.S. foreign banks were uniformly regulated under
federal legislation.
B. The IBA and its Purpose
In 1978, the Senate Coimnittee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs expressed its following concerns:
There is, at this time, no uniform
national policy concerning foreign
banking operations in this country. As a
result, foreign banks enjoy many
competitive advantages over our domestic
banks .^^
In order to solve these problems, Congress wanted to
create a principle of parity of treatment for both foreign
and domestic banks in like circumstances. Furthermore,
Congress would like to govern foreign banks with a universal
set of federal regulations. Enacting the IBA, Congress
combined two policy objectives into this bill:"" (1) to
provide a system of federal supervision and regulation of
foreign banking activities in the U.S., and (2) to provide,
to the extent possible, national treatment for foreign banks
and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and
Urban Affairs, 95th Conga., 1st Sees. 102, 135 (1977)
[hereinafter Int'l Banking Act of 1977: House Hearings];
Joint Economic Comm. 89th Conga., 2d Sees., Foreign The
United States (Economic Practices, Paper No. 9) (Comm. Print
1966)
.
^^ International Banking Act of 1978: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Conga., 2d Sees.
46 (Table 22) (1978) [hereinafter Int'l Banking Act of 1978:
Senate Hearings]
.
^^ Senate Rep. No. 1073, 95th Conga., 2d Sees. 2 (1978)
{reprinted in 1978 U.S. C.A.N. 1421, 1422).
11
operating in the United States. "'^^ Under the doctrine of
national treatment, "foreign enterprises . . . are treated as
competitive equals with their domestic counterparts.""^^
According to the Congress, the purpose of "national
treatment" for U.S. foreign banks' operations requests that
foreign banks be treated substantially equivalent to U.S.
domestic banks. "^^ The principle of national treatment is
based on the concept that foreign and domestic banks have a
fair and equal opportunity to compete with each other in the
U.S. banking market. ^^
For a foreign bank, the national treatment means that,
unless otherwise provided, it never enjoys an advantage over
its U.S. domestic counterparts, nor are they discriminated
against compared to U.S. domestic banks. ''° With the
enactment of the IBA, foreign banks were subjected to the
United States' unique banking structure: the dual banking
^^ Victoria Marmorstein and James Keller, Review of Foreign
Banks ^ Supervisory Initiatives Taken by Federal Reserve
Board in Recent Months, 64 The Bureau of National Affairs
Banking Report 391-92 (Feb. 20, 1995) [hereinafter
Marmorstein]
.
^^ Carr & More, supra note 34, at 231 (stating IBA
subjected foreign banks to parity of treatment with domestic
counterparts)
.
^^ See supra note 35, at 1422.
^^ Frank Anthony Misuraca, Foreign Banking in the United
States: An Objective Study of the International Banking Act
of 1978, 4 J. Int'l L. & Prac . 539, 542 (1995).
"^ Id. at 543.
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system/^ As mentioned earlier, prior to the passage of the
IBA, foreign banks were regulated by individual state law.
After the enactment of the IBA, however, the banking
activities of foreign banks were governed by both federal
and state governments. At the federal level, the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) are in charge of
controlling foreign banks. ''^
C. Major Provisions of the IBA
In enacting the IBA, Congress' primary purpose was to
limit the foreign banks' U.S. operations. Most provisions
of the IBA restricted foreign banks' U.S. operations, only a
few stipulations were in favor of foreign banks. After the
enactment of the IBA, the activities of foreign banks were
severely limited. Following are the major provisions of the
IBA:
1. Geographic Restrictions
Pursuant to section 5(c) of the IBA, a foreign bank
should select one state as its home state from those states
in which it has any branch, agency, subsidiary commercial
lending company, or subsidiary bank.^^ However, if a
foreign bank does not have a branch, agency, subsidiary
commercial lending company, or subsidiary bank in more than
one state, the home state of the foreign bank is the state
^^ Patrick F. McMahon, Note, The International Banking Act
of 1978: Federal Regulation of Foreign Banks in the United
States, 8 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 145, 159 (1978).
^^ Misuraca, supra note 39, at 543.
43 12 U.S.C.A. s 3103 (c)(1) (1996).
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in which the foreign bank has a branch, agency, subsidiary
commercial lending company, or subsidiary bank/'' Unless
otherwise provided, a foreign bank may not, directly or
indirectly, acquire, establish, or operate a new branch or
agency in any state other than its home state. ''^ Under the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System's (the
Federal Reserve) regulations, a foreign bank, upon prior
notice to the Federal Reserve, may change its IBA home state
only one time/^ However, there is an exception to this
rule, section 5(b) of the IBA grandfathered a foreign bank's
operations that were in existence, or for which applications
had been filed on or before the date of the IBA' s passage."^
Basically, these provisions eliminated foreign banks'
ability to create interstate branches and are instrumental
in placing foreign banks on a level playing field along side
U.S. domestic banks.
2. FDIC Insurance Requirement
The stock market crash of 1929, together with the
accompanying nationwide series of bank failures through the
mid-1930s, provided catastrophic evidence of the need for
further improvements in the nation's bank regulatory system.
The resultant statutory improvements included, inter alia,
the amendment of the Federal Reserve Act in June 1933,
establishing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
44
45
46
47
Id. s 3103 (c) (2) .
Id. s 3103 (a) (5)
.
12 C.F.R. s 211.22(b) (1996).
12 U.S.C.A. s 3103(b) (1996).
14
(^'FDIC") . FDIC deposit insurance and assessments are
mandatory for essentially all domestic banks, "^ as well as
for federal branches, and state branches of foreign banks
that receive any significant level of retail deposits of
less than $ 100,000.''^ The regulations generally restrict an
uninsured branch only with respect to "retail deposits,"
which are deposits under $ 100,000 in initial amount from
U.S. individuals and very small domestic corporations. As a
result, the limitations on retail deposit-taking have had
little, if any, detrimental impact on a foreign bank
primarily seeking a corporate deposit base in the United
States. With these provisions. Congress took away the
advantages enjoyed by foreign banks. At the same time, this
section provide assurance that individuals who deposited
their money with foreign banks would be federally protected.
3. Reserve Requirement
Section 7 (a) of the IBA generally imposed reserve
requirements^" for deposits on all U.S. branch (any agency)
^^ See, e.g. 12 U.S.C.A s 1814 (1996) . Participation in
the federal deposit insurance program is, mandatory for all
national banks and for all state-chartered banks that are
members of the Federal Reserve System. In addition, the
laws of almost all states require commercial banks to obtain
FDIC insurance.
'^ 12 C.F.R. s 346.4, 346.6 (1996). A federal branch may
apply to the Comptroller and a state branch may apply to the
FDIC for permission to accept deposits of less than $
100,000 without deposit insurance. Id. s 346.6.
^° Legal reserve requirements have been specified since the
Federal Reserve Act of 1913 in terms of a range of
alternative reserve ratios, rather than a single fixed
percentage. This allows the Federal Reserve Board to vary
reserve requirements somewhat for most larger banks
15
operations. Previously, foreign banks were not required to
maintain a reserve amount of their assets, which was a
considerable advantage over their domestic competitors.
According to this provision, foreign banks are required to
maintain reserves against their liabilities.^^ This new
requirement eliminated "a significant advantage they had
over U.S. competitors."^^
(national banks and all state chartered member banks) . This
provides a powerful, but relatively crude method by which
big reductions in bank reserves and bank loans can be
enforced. (Most banks normally carry a narrow margin of
excess reserves so that they can obtain a maximum volume of
interest on assets to achieve the greatest yield available)
.
The scope of reserve requirements is broad. This is because
reserve requirements are aimed at control of monetary
policy, not banking regulation. Fundamentally, reserves are
held against deposits. Reserves may be held in vault cash
(United States currency and coin and numismatic coins
exceeding their face value) , a balance maintained at a
reserve bank, or a pass-through account. Banks also
maintain balances with the Federal Reserve to cover certain
services it provides, such as clearings; excess in these
balances may be counted as reserves. It should be noted
that the Federal Reserve pays no interest on the reserves
deposited with it by banks.
Reserve requirements do serve an important protective
function in forcing banks to hold enough cash and/or liquid
securities as a prudential safeguard against the risk of
runs on banks. Higher reserves are required for demand or
transactional accounts than for time deposits. The reason
is that demand deposit withdrawals tend to occur more
quickly, and before banks can borrow enough extra reserves
from other banks, the Federal Reserve or other government
agencies
.
^^ 12 U.S.C.A s 3105 (1996) .
^^ I. Barry Thompson, Jnternationai Banking Act: For
Regional Banks a New Challenge and Opportunity, ABA Banking
Journal 45 (Jan. 1980
16
4. Non-banking Activity Restriction^"'
Section 8 of the IBA imposes nonbanking restrictions on
foreign banks. Basically, the IBA applied the same
limitations on foreign banks as were imposed on domestic
banks through the BHCA. Thus, foreign banks are prohibited
from engaging in activities that are not "so closely related
to banking".^'' However, pursuant to section 8 (c) of the
IBA, nonbanking activities in which a foreign bank was
lawfully engaged on July 26, 1978 are grandfathered. In
addition to the grandfather clause, there is another
exception to this rule. That is, if the Federal Reserve is
satisfied with both following two requirements: (a) the
foreign bank does more than half of its banking business
outside the U.S. and, (b) over half of its world-wide
business is in the banking field, then a foreign bank's non-
banking activities are not limited on its U.S. branch.
^^ U.S. domestic banks and bank holding companies are
limited in the extent to which they can engage in nonbanking
activities. National banks, for example, are generally
limited to banking activities that are incidental to the
business of banking. See 12 U.S.C. s 24(7). Banking
holding companies generally are prohibited from engaging in
nonbanking activities, with certain specified exceptions.
See 12 U.S.C. s 1843(c). The most important exception is
that bank holding companies may engage in, or acquire
control of companies that engage in, nonbanking activities
that are so closely related to banking, managing, or
controlling as to pass the "proper incident" test. See 12
U.S.C. S1843 (c)(8). Also, the Glass Steagall Act subjects
both banks and bank holding companies to certain
restrictions on securities activities. See 12 U.S.C.
s24(7)
.
54 12 U.S.C. A. s 3102 (1996)
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5. Permission of Edge Corporation
Section 3 of the IBA enabled foreign banks, for the
first time, to establish Edge corporation subsidiaries under
section 25(a) of the F.R.A.^^ Edge corporations are
federally charted corporations whose business must generally
be connected with international or foreign banking
operations . ^^ An Edge corporation permits a bank to take
international deposits and conduct international business
across state lines. Thus, for example, deposits must be
from a foreign source, for immediate transmittal abroad, or
related to an international transaction.^^ Lending activity
must be related to foreign projects, imports, or exports. ^^
Payments transactions must concern issuing letter of
credits, international or cross-border payments, and foreign
exchange transactions.^^ A foreign bank may establish an
Edge corporation subsidiary in any state, regardless of
state laws that may prohibit or restrict foreign banks from
^^ 12 U.S.C.A. s 611-632 (1996). A foreign bank can also
acquire a state-chartered Agreement Corporation limited to
an international banking business. See^ e.g.. Bank of
Tokyo, LTD/Tokyo Bancorp Int'l, 62 Fed. Res. Bull. 164
(1976). However, Agreement Corporations must be established
in each state and cannot branch nationwide, as Edge
corporations have been authorized to do after the IBA.
^^ 21 U.S.C. s 611 and 12 C.F.R. s 211 . 4 (e) (1993) . See
also D. Lehr and C. MacRae, Foreign Banks in the United
States: Acquisitions^ Branching^ and Other Techniques, 3 J.
Comp. Corp. L. Sec. Reg. 202, 205-6 (1981)
.
^' 12 C.F.R. s 211.4 (e) (1) (1993) .
^^ Id., s 211.4 (e) (4) (1993) .
^' Id., s 211.4 (e) (4) (iii) , 211.4(e)(5), and 211 . 4 (e) (6)
,
respectively (1993)
.
18
entering either directly or indirectly through establishing
or acquiring state-chartered subsidiary bank.^° In
addition, with the Fed's prior approval an Edge corporation
can establish branch offices nationwide and statewide. ^^
Finally, an Edge corporation is authorized to conduct
certain deposit activities related to international
banking, ^^ whereas an agency generally is not permitted to
accept any deposits. ^^ The reason for allowing foreign
banks to establish Edge corporations is required by the
national treatment policy. U.S. domestic banks can create
an Edge corporation, according to the national policy,
therefore, foreign banks should be permitted to do the same
However, the freedom of an Edge corporation to establish
branches must be weighted against the activity limitations
placed on these corporations. Their banking business must
be international in nature. In other words, generally
speaking, foreign banks can engage in a broader range of
activities through a branch than through an Edge
corporation.
60
61
62
63
12 U.S.C.A. s 615 (1996)
.
See 12 C.F.R. s 211.4 (1996).
Id. s 211.4 (e)
.
Conniver, 715 F. 2d 604 (DC Cir. 1983), cert denied, 466
U.S. (1984), (agencies are not allowed to accept foreign
deposits); 12 U.S.C.A. s 3102(d) (1996).
CHAPTER III. THE FOREIGN BANK SUPERVISION ENHANCEMENT ACT
OF 1991
A. Background
In mid-1991, the Federal Reserve submitted proposed
legislation to Congress to strengthen the supervision and
regulation of foreign bank operations in the United States.
The proposed legislation was introduced as the Foreign Bank
Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991 ("FBSEA")^\ and was
enacted on December 19, 1991. FBSEA was a reaction to three
situations: the collapse of Bank of Credit and Commerce
International (BCCI), the illegal loan at the Atlanta agency
of an Italian bank named Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL)
,
and the Greek National Mortgage Bank(GNMB) 's New York
representative office problem.
The international financial community was riveted by
allegations concerning the activities of BCCI. "The World's
Sleaziest Bank" was the headline on the cover of Time
magazine on July 29, 1991. BCCI was a Luxembourg-based bank
operating in over seventy-two countries which at one time
was the seventh-largest private bank in the world, and the
200th largest bank in the world overall, with stated capital
of $1.5 billion and stated assets worth over $20 billion. ^^
^^ Pub.L. 102-242, 102d Conga., 1st Sees. (Dec. 19, 1991),
105 Stat. 2286-2305 (1991)
.
The BCCI Affair: Hearings before Subcomm. on Terrorism,
Narcotics, and International Operations of Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 102d Conga., 1st Sees., pt 1, 86 (Aug. 1-
2, and 8, 1991) (prepared statement of J. Virgil Mattingly,
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Expanding its operations worldwidely, BCCI considered
establishing a banking presence in the United States. ^^
Securing a national charter would have been difficult,
however, as the OCC would have questioned its substandard
operation and capitalization standards/^ BCCI, instead,
entered the United States banking market through state
certification. It was in 1978 that BCCI first tried to
purchase a New York bank.^^ However, the New York State
Banking Department rejected BCCI's application, because they
''find it difficult to judge the financial capacity of the
applicant . ''^^ Ultimately, BCCI obtained the state
Banking Supervision and Regulations, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System [hereinafter Mattingly
Statement] ) . See also R. Donkin, "BCCI dealings are being
watched by central banks," Fin. Times (London), Oct. 18,
1988, at 28, col. 3, and E. Corrigan, J. Mattingly and W.
Taylor, The Federal Reserve^ s Views on BCCI, 26 Int'l. Law.
963, 968 (1992)
.
^^ Steve Lohr, Officials Say BCCI Owners Left a California
Bank Reeling, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1991, at D6. Internal
BCCI documents reveal that BCCI had ambitious plans for
expansion in the United States banking market. Id.
^^ See supra note 56, at D6. (noting BCCI documents
revealed that bank officials knew federal authorities would
bar purchase of domestic banks). In the late 1970's, a
group of Middle Eastern investor, tacitly affiliated with
BCCI, entered into a consent decree with the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") agreeing to dissolve their
holdings in a domestic bank holding company. 77
Fed. Res. Bull. 572, 573 (1991). The SEC had filed a
complaint against the group for failing to notify the SEC of
its purchases of the target bank shares. Id.
CO
E. Corrigan, J. Mattingly and W. Taylor; The Federal
Reserve's Views on BCCI, 26 Int'L. Law. 964.
^^ J. ADAMS AND D. FRANTZ, A FULL SERVICE BANK 4 7 (1992)
.
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certificate from Florida, California and New York."' At the
peak of its overt legal presence in the United States, BCCI
operated six agencies and several representative offices in
various cities throughout the United States. ^^
In a global operation on July 5, 1991, authorities in
eight nations closed all the BCCI branches located within
their jurisdictions because of evidence of BCCI's widespread
fraud, including fraudulent concealment of losses from its
lending and trading operations . ^^ By July 6, 1991, BCCI
offices in eighteen countries either were closed or had
their operations restricted.^'' The closure of BCCI branches
continued for several weeks, and by July 29, 1991 forty-four
jurisdictions had closed BCCI offices located within their
boarders .'"^
'° 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 791, 792 (1991). Neither federal nor
state authorities ever certified BCCI to accept deposits
(i.e. operate a branch). Id. BCCI ultimately operated
agencies in New York City, San Francisco, Los Angeles,
Miami, Tampa, and Boca Raton. Id. Additionally, it
operated representative offices in Washington, D.C. and in
Houston. Id.
^^ See 11 Fed. Res. Bull. 791, 792 (1991) (discussing BCCI
operation of agencies and representative offices in several
United States cities)
.
''^ Max Hall, The BCCI Affair, BANKING WORLD, Sept. 1991, at
8. The eight nations were the Cayman Islands, France,
Germany, Luxembourg, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. Id. Indeed, on that day, action to
shut down BCCI's activities was taken in more than sixty
nations. Id.
^^ Mattingly Statement, supra note 65, at 903.
'' Id.
22
The immediate reason for the closure of BCCI was the
Bank of England's receipt of a June 1991 report prepared by
Price Waterhouse that detailed massive fraud committed by
BCCI's senior managers. ^^ Through the mid-1980s the
treasure operations of BCCI suffered huge losses. Senior
managers siphoned off deposits to cover these losses. ^^ If
the depositors withdrew their money, then other deposits
were diverted to cover the losses. This resulted in an
endless series of fraudulent transactions.^^ Senior
managers, board members, and representatives of major
shareholders participated in the fraud by making fictitious
loans; failing to record deposit and dealing in their own
shares in order to manufacture profits. ^^ BCCI also used
'^ Max Hall, The BCCI Affair, BANKING WORLD, September
1991, at 8. The Bank of England had commissioned the report
under section 41 of the 1987 Banking Act, which permits the
investigation of banks on behalf of depositors. Banking
Act, 1987, ch.22, s 41, 4 Halsbury' s Statutes of England and
Wales 527, 574-76 (4th ed. 1987)
.
^^ David Lascelle, A Never-ending Spiral of Fraud, FIN.
TIMES, October 22, 1991, at 32. There are estimates that
BCCI raised over $600 million in unrecorded deposits. See
All Things to All Men, THE ECONOMIST, July 27, 1991, at 67,
68.
^^ Lascelle, supra note 76, at 32.
^^ Hall, supra note 72, at 8. For example, BCCI reported
loans of $445 million to Ghaith Pharaon, a Saudi business
executive, and $796 million to the Gokal family in Pakistan;
both borrowers were shareholders of First American
Bankshares, which was secretly owned by BCCI. These loans
were not secured with any assets, nor were they in fact made
to the named individuals. See Jonathan Friedland, Rest in
Pieces, FAR E. ECON. REV., September 26, 1991, at 64, 66.
See generally JAMES R. ADAMS & DOUGLAS FRANZ, A FULL SERVICE
BANK: HOW BCCI STOLE BILLIONS AROUND THE WORLD (1992)
.
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client names to trade on its own account.^'' BCCI managers
hid the losses caused by bad trades, unpaid loans, and
fraudulent practices by shuttling assets between
subsidiaries .^° In 1988 alone BCCI subsidiaries paid each
other $152 million in fee income. ^^ The BCCI collapse, in
particular, focused the Fed' s attention on the lack of
consolidated supervision over BCCI's vast international
operations as well as BCCI' acquisitions, without the Fed's
approval, of control of more than 25% of the voting shares
of major U.S. banking organizations. During its operations
in the United States, BCCI secretly controlled four U.S.
banks: First American Bank, headquartered in Washington,
D.C.; the National Bank of Georgia; CenTrust Savings Bank of
Florida; and the Independence Bank of Encino, California. ^^
Eight of BCCI's largest customers used $ 1.4 billion
borrowed from BCCI to buy shares in CCAH.^^
79
80
All Things to All Men, supra note 7 6, at 67
The Many Facades of BCCI, THE ECONOMIST, July 13, 1991,
at 81. In addition. Price Waterhouse discovered a secret
'''bank within a bank," controlled by top BCCI officials,
which hid losses and plugged holes in the balance sheets by
raising deposits without recording them. Id.
81 Id.
^^ Federal Reserve System, Statement by J. Virgil
Mattingly, Jr., General Counsel, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, Before the Subcommittee on
Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations of the
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, May 14, 1992,
78 Fed. Res. Bull. 504, 505 (1992). See also The Opening-up
of BCCI: Send for Richard Hannay, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 3,
1991, at 21, 23.
®^ David Laciness, A Never-ending Spiral of Fraud, FIN.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 1991, at 32.
24
The BNL matter involved the discovery that the bank's
state-licensed agency in Atlanta conducted a significant
part of its banking businesses off its books; specifically,
it made close to $ 3 billion in illegal loans to Iraq, which
went to finance weapon sales in conflict with U.S. policy.*^''
This lending was kept secret from bank examiners and
arguably from the bank's own head office. As with the BCCI
matter, the Federal Reserve considered it essential to have
the authority to investigate fully the types of transactions
that arose in the BNL case. This case also heightened the
Fed's belief that it needed clear authority to share bank
examination information on a confidential basis with foreign
banking authorities.
The GNMB case concerned allegations of unsafe and
unsound banking practices and violations of laws and
regulations arising from its receipt of deposits at
representative offices of the NMBG (a U.S. non-bank
affiliate of the National Bank of Greece) . As part of a
cease and desist order consented to by the NMBG, fines
totaling over $2 million were paid. This case underscored
the Fed' s lack of federal regulatory and supervisory
oversight of representative offices.
^'' House Banking Staff Questions Foreign Bank Regulations
in BNL Atlanta Scandal, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) 612 (Oct. 15,
1990) . See also Statement by William Taylor, Staff
Director, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, before the
Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, U.S. House
of representatives (Oct. 16, 1990), reprinted in 76 Fed.
Reserve Bull. 1031, 1032 (Dec. 1990).
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Among the acknowledged limitations of the (pre-FBSEA)
IBA and other federal banking laws, as evidenced by the BCCI
and other foreign bank scandals, were:
lack of federal banking agency approval
process for applications submitted by
foreign banks seeking to establish
state-licensed branches and agencies in
the United States; limitations on the
Fed's authority to examine U.S. branches
and agencies of foreign banks; inability
of federal regulators to terminate the
U.S. operations of state-licensed
branches and agencies found to have
engaged in unsafe and unsound practices
or to have violated the law; inability
to exclude foreign banks from having
U.S. operations when those banks were
not subject to comprehensive supervision
on a consolidated basis by their home
country regulator; absence of any
reporting requirement for loans secured
by 25% or more of the bank stock of an
insured U.S. financial institution where
the foreign lender itself did not
operate a U.S. insured bank or branch;
and, lack of any investigative authority
under the IBA.^^
B. Purpose of the FBSEA
As discussed before, the development of the FBSEA was a
direct result of the BCCI banking scandal, as well as
several other foreign bank scandals. ^^ The FBSEA was not
^^ Irwin L. Gubman, James S. Keller, Coudert Brothers,
Supervision of Foreign Banks in the United States, R179 ALI-
ABA 115 (1993)
.
^^ 137 CONG.REC. s 5615, s 5616-17 (daily ed. May 9, 1991)
(statement of Sen. Riegle) . Senator Riegle stated that
FBSEA developed in response to BCCI and BNL scandals; see
also 137 CONG.REC. s 5615, s 5622 (1991) (reprinting letter
from Senator Riegle to Mr. Greenspan citing BCCI as catalyst
to investigate new legislation); 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 572, 572
(1991) (reporting Virgil Mattingly, General Counsel to Board
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intended to drastically alter the current regulatory regime
in place under the IBA/^ It was intended, rather, to close
perceived gaps in the current regulatory structure which had
proven vulnerable to exploitation.^^ The FBSEA seeks to
accomplish this goal by requiring the Federal Reserve to
screen foreign banks according to their financial and
managerial status, by requiring that foreign banks operating
in the United States be subject to consolidated home country
reviews, by forcing foreign banks to agree in advance to
surrendering certain categories of information, by
consolidating review powers in the Federal Reserve, by
granting the Federal Reserve punitive powers and by
requiring foreign banks to disclose certain loans to the
Federal Reserve. ^^
of Governors, stated that FBSEA product of foreign bank
scandals)
.
^"^ 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 644, 645 (1991). Testifying before the
House Committee on Banking, finance and Urban Affairs, Mr.
Greenspan stated that the FBSEA '"is not intended to impose
sweeping new requirements or to alter radically the
framework governing foreign bank operations in the United
States. Rather, its purpose is to build upon and complement
the exciting supervisory structure to full those regulatory
and supervisory gaps that experience has demonstrated
exist." Id.
'' Id.
^^ S.REP. NO. 1019, reprinted in 137 CONG.REC. s 5615
(daily ed. May 9, 1991) . Senator Riegle stated that,
although the IBA gave general supervisory power to the Fed,
it failed to give it the '"tools" to effect meaning control
over domestic operations of foreign banks. Id. Senator
Riegle stated that IBA regulatory framework has resulted in
a "patchwork" of state and federal regulation. 137
CONG.REC. s 5615, s 5617 (daily ed. May 9, 1991) . He
suggested that this patchwork resulted in numerous loopholes
which foreign banks have exploited. Id. See also 11
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C. Major Provisions of the FBSEA
The FBSEA creates four major changes in the IBA'
s
exiting regulatory scheme. ^° The net effect is a
comprehensive response to the concerns about the differences
between the individual states' regulation of foreign banks
and the difficulty in monitoring the disparate and growing
foreign presence. ^^
1 . Entry Approval
The most prominent provision of the FBSEA is the
requirement that all foreign banks seeking to establish
either state or federally chartered operations in the U.S.
receive approval from the Federal Reserve to enter the U.S.
Fed. Res. Bull. 644, 648 (1991). Mr. Greenspan testified that
the FBSEA would amend the IBA by codifying the federal
banking agencies' power to share information with
appropriate foreign regulatory agencies. Id. See 137
CONG.REC. s 5615, s 5620 (daily ed. May 9, 1991) (discussing
FBSEA centralization of regulation, supervision and control
powers over foreign banks in the Federal Reserve)
.
90
91
12 U.S.C. s 3104, 3105(c), (d)
, (e) (Sup. IV 1992).
Statement by John P. LaWare, Member, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, before the Subcommittee on
Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance
and the Subcommittee on International Development, Finance,
Trade and Monetary Policy of the Committee on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives,
November 20, 1991, reprinted in 78 Fed. Res .Bull . 31, 34
(Jan. 1992) [hereinafter LaWare Statement - Nov. 20, 1991].
" [The FBSEA] ensures that foreign bank operations in this
country are regulated, supervised and examined in the same
manner as U.S. banks." Statement by Virgil Mattingly, Jr.,
General Counsel, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, before the Subcommittee on Consumer and Regulatory
Affairs of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, U.S. Senate (May 23, 1991), reprinted in 77
Fed. Res. Bull. 572, 579 (July 1991) [hereinafter Mattingly
Statement - May 23, 1991]
.
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banking market. '''' The Federal Reserve intends to ensure,
through the application procedure (and subsequent
supervision) , that only "adequately capitalized and properly
supervised non-U. S. banking organizations are permitted to
participate in the U.S. markets for financial services. "^^
Clearing the Fed' s initial or subsequent review is a
necessary, but not sufficient condition for beginning or
maintaining operations; a foreign bank must still gain
initial and ongoing approval from the state in which it is
chartered.^'' If the foreign bank seeks a national (i.e.
federal) charter, the Federal Reserve will grant initial
approval, then the OCC must also approve the applicant
before the Federal Reserve assumes supervisory and
regulatory control. ^^
In taking control of, and consolidating, the market
entry requirements and channels, the Federal Reserve
accomplishes two important objectives. First, the Federal
Reserve takes the responsibility for overseeing all the
foreign bank operations in the U.S. (and has a realistic
opportunity for doing so by having all foreign banks come to
it as they enter the country). ^^ Second, the entry criteria
92
93
12 U.S.C. s 3105(d) (1) (Sup. IV 1992).
Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, Colloquim: U.S. Restructuring
Legislation: Revising the International Banking Act of 1978^
For the Worse?, 60 Fordham L. Rev. 37, 41 (1992)
.
^' 12 U.S.C. s 3105(h) (3) (Sup. IV 1992). See also H.
Rep. No. 330, 102d Conga. 1st Sees., 106, reprinted in 1991
U.S.C. C.A.N. 1919.
^^ 12 U.S.C. s 3102(a) (2) (Sup. IV 1992).
^^ 12 U.S.C. s 3105(c)(1) (A) (Sup. IV 1992).
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have been drafted so that upon approval of a foreign
applicant, the Federal Reserve can be confident that the
foreign bank, and its parent organization, are subject to
consolidated comprehensive supervision by their home country
supervisor . ^^ Recognizing the fact that the Federal Reserve
cannot directly govern a foreign branch' s parent bank
itself, the Federal Reserve must utilize this entry approval
procedure to become confident with the foreign regulator's
framework. ^^
To be allowed entry into the U.S., the FBSEA
establishes two standards that a foreign bank must meet: 1)
home country comprehensive and consolidated supervision,
which requires that the foreign bank engage directly in the
97 12 U.S.C. s 3105(d)(2) (A) (Sup. IV 1992
^^ This notion of trusting the effectiveness of foreign
banking regulatory framework is an emerging international
trend. At the Bank for International Settlements in Basle,
Switzerland, a committee entitled the Basle Committee on
Banking Supervision (Basle Committee) was formed to address
the differences between nations in domestic and foreign bank
regulation and supervision. On July 6, 1992, six months
after U.S. Congress passed the FBSEA, the Basle Committee
set out minimum standards for the supervision of
international banks. See Basle Committee on Banking
Regulation and Supervisory Practices, Report on Minimum
Standards for the Supervision of International Banking
Groups and Their Cross Boarder Establishments, June 1992,
reprinted in International Economic Law Documents, Document
II-I, 1992. The guidelines, like the FBSEA, require that
every international bank be regulated on a consolidated
(i.e. global) basis by its home country regulators. Id. at
section II-l. That is to say that the guidelines prevent
any sharing, or splitting, of supervisory responsibility
between two or more nations over a bank with international
operations. Id. Additionally, the guidelines discourage
bank regulators from accepting into their borders those
international banks that they feel have otherwise
insufficient home country supervision. Id. at II.
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banking business outside of the United States and be subject
to comprehensive and consolidated supervision or regulation
in its home country,'^'' and 2) adequate and necessary
information, which requires that the foreign bank provide
the Federal Reserve with necessary information for the
Federal Reserve to "adequately assess" the application. ^°°
1) Home Country Comprehensive and Consolidated Supervision
Through the FBSEA, the Federal Reserve seeks to create
a statutory requirement that any foreign bank entrant be
subject to comprehensive supervision on a consolidated basis
by a home country regulator. To this end, the FBSEA
requires that any potential entrant into the U.S. banking
market identify its principal home-country supervisor. If
this parent organization's supervision does not meet the
requirements of the U.S. federal regulators, the federal
regulators can deny entry.
The language of the statute allows the Federal Reserve
a great deal of discretion in interpreting the term
"adequately assess." Through this adequate assessment the
Federal Reserve hopes to reach a level of trust in the
foreign bank's domestic regulation that is so important to
the Federal Reserve finding comprehensive consolidated
supervision. Without comprehensive consolidated
supervision, a foreign application cannot be approved. -^"^ It
^^ 12 U.S.C. s 3105(d)(2) (Sup. IV 1992).
^°° Id.
101 The U.S. is not alone in putting such an emphasis on
comprehensive consolidated supervision. See supra note 81
and the accompanying text.
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was the lack of consolidated supervision that allowed the
BCCI to create an octopus-like operation which effectively
eluded supervision, thereby concealing the fraudulent
practices for which that bank was later dissolved. ^°^
Under the FBSEA, the Federal Reserve takes the
following considerations into account when it determines
whether a specific applicant's home country supervisor
provides comprehensive and consolidated supervision in a
particular case.'^"^ Among the considerations, no one is
determinative, nor is the list exhaustive, but the factors
were included in recognition that different countries have
different financial instruments and that different
regulators employ different definitions . ^°'' These
considerations include:
(a) ensuring that individual banks which they oversee have
adequate procedures for monitoring and controlling domestic
and international activities;
(b) collecting regular reports (e.g. audits) on the
condition of the parent bank, and the subsidiaries and
offices outside the home country;
^°^ See supra Section III (A) .
^°^ 12 C.F.R. s 211.25(c)(1) (ii) (1993).
^°^
"The Capital Equivalency Report is required by the
Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991, and also
includes guidelines the Federal Reserve Board will use in
converting data of foreign bank capital to its equivalent
under U.S. regulations." Basle Accord, U.S. Capital
Standards Compared in Joint Treasury-Fed Report, 58 Banking
Rep. (NBA) 1151 (June 29, 1992)
.
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(c) collecting information regarding the relationship
between the parent bank and its foreign and domestic
affiliates;
(d) collecting financial reports that are consolidated on a
worldwide basis; and
(e) evaluating prudential standards (e.g. capital adequacy)
on a worldwide basis. ^"^
2) Adequate and Necessary Information
Under the FBSEA, the Federal Reserve has imposed more
demanding information requirements, particularly with regard
to management, ownership and financial condition, in
connection with applications by foreign banks and other non-
U.S. persons to acquire direct or indirect interest in U.S.
banks or to expand U.S. nonbanking activities. The FBSEA
requires a foreign bank in connection with the establishment
of new offices in the United States to assure the Federal
Reserve that it will make available "such information on the
operations or activities of the foreign bank and any
affiliate of the bank that the Board (Federal Reserve) deems
necessary to determine and enforce compliance with" the U.S.
banking laws.'^"^ While this requirement sounds self evident,
it is quite important to the Federal Reserve.
3) Other Considerations
Beyond the two required standards for entry approval, the
FBSEA suggests four discretionary standards for
consideration: -^"^
^°^ 12 C.F.R. s 211.25(c) (1) (ii) (1993).
^°^ Id. s 211.25(c) (2) (V) .
^°'' 12 U.S.C. s 3105(d)(3) (Sup. IV 1992).
33
(a) whether the home country authorities have approved the
bank's proposed U.S. expansion; ^°^
(b) "'the financial and managerial resources of the foreign
bank, including the bank' s experience and capacity to engage
in international banking; "^°^
(c) whether the bank can continually provide such
information that the Federal Reserve deems necessary to
ensure compliance with all applicable federal laws;^^° and
(d) whether the bank is currently in compliance with U.S.
law
.
These standards allow smaller foreign banks to
demonstrate their merits, even if they are dwarfed in size
and prestige by the Japanese or German banking giants. ^^^
2. Termination
To effectively maintain control over these foreign
branches, the FBSEA also provides that the Federal Reserve
may terminate the operations of a state as well as federally
chartered foreign bank for banking regulation violations,
and recommend to the OCC that it terminate the operations of
a federally chartered foreign bank off ice. ^'^^ Under the
108
109
110
111
112
12 U.S.C. s 3105(d) (3) (A) (Sup. IV 1992)
.
12 U.S.C. s 3105(d) (3) (B) (Sup. IV 1992)
12 U.S.C. s 3105(d) (3) (C) (Sup. IV 1992)
12 U.S.C. s 3105(d) (3) (D) (Sup. IV 1992)
Often in the U.S., bigger banks enjoy misconceptions
that their size reflects, somehow, quality. See H.R. Rep.
No. 330, supra note 75, at 96, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C. C.A.N
at 1909.
^" 12 U.S.C. s 3105(e)(5) (Sup. IV 1992).
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FBSEA, the Federal Reserve may terminate the activities if
it finds that either: (a) the parent bank is not subject to
comprehensive consolidated home country supervision;"'' or
(b) if "there is reasonable cause to believe""^ that the
office has committed a violation of law or engaged in unsafe
or unsound banking practices, and this violation makes
continued operation of the office inconsistent with public
interest . '^^^ The FBSEA also mandates civil penalties for
these violations."^
3. Deposits
The FBSEA restricts the latitude of foreign banks to
take deposits. Under the FBSEA, a foreign bank may not
"accept or maintain" deposit accounts in the United States
having balances of less than $100,000, unless the foreign
institution establishes one or more FDIC-insured, U.S. bank
subsidiaries for this purpose."^ New insured retail
branches may not be established by foreign banks; however,
branches existing prior to the FBSEA are grandfathered
provided that they continue to operate in compliance with
"''
"Grandfathering" is an accepted international practice
for "protecting investment in existing foreign banking
operations at a time of statutory change." LaWare Statement
- Nov. 20, 1991, supra note 93, at 33. The Federal Reserve
considers grandfathering an important national banking
policy that lends confidence and stability to market
participants. See id.
"^ 12 U.S.C. s 3105(e) (1) (B) (I) (Sup. IV 1992)
.
"^ Id.
"^ See supra note 94.
"^ 12 U.S.C. s 3104(c)(1) (Sup. IV 1992).
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section 6 of IBA.^^'' Uninsured deposits of less than
$100,000 are acceptable, so long as they are wholesale
deposits . ^^°
4. Examinations
In order to standardize regulations for state and
federally chartered foreign banks, the FBSEA restricts state
chartered foreign banks to activities permitted by the OCC
for federally chartered foreign banks. ^^^ If a state
chartered foreign bank wants to engage in activities
permitted by state law, but not sanctioned by the OCC, the
bank must seek specific Federal Reserve's approval . '^^^
Approval depends on the safety and soundness of the
particular activity. In the case of an insured branch, the
FDIC must also determine that the activity poses no threat
to the insurance fund.'^^^
The FBSEA grants the Federal Reserve the authority to
conduct on-site foreign bank inspections annually . ^^'' These
federal examinations supplement the existing examination by
the individual state or the OCC. The FBSEA authorizes the
Federal Reserve to require simultaneous, consolidated
examinations of each U.S. office and affiliate of any
foreign bank. The Federal Reserve coordinates the annual
119
120
121
122
123
124
12 U.S.C. s 3104(c)(2) (Sup. IV 1992).
12 U.S.C. s 3104(b)(1) (Sup. IV 1992).
12 U.S.C. s 3105(h) (Sup. IV 1992).
12 U.S.C. s 3105(h) (1) (A) (Sup. IV 1992)
12 U.S.C s 3105(h) (1) (B) (Sup. IV 1992)
.
12 U.S.C. s 3105(c) (Sup. IV 1992).
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examination schedule of each foreign bank, and has many
options within its authority: it can conduct its own annual
examinations; it can rely on the state or the OCC
examination results; it can alternate annual examinations
with the state or the OCC; or it can coordinate joint
examinations . ^^^ Public statements by staff members and
agency actions make clear that the Federal Reserve is, in
fact, already emphasizing such a simultaneous exam approach.
Again, in no small measure, this may be attributed to
concerns over the adequacy of past supervision and
examinations of BCCI and other foreign bank scandals.
Although not required by the statute, the Federal Reserve
officials also have emphasized that examinations of U.S.
offices of foreign banks will be broader in scope than past
federal and state exams and will include review of
operational matters, internal controls, audits, regulatory
compliance and other matters. With this authority, the
FBSEA puts the Federal Reserve in the position of "primary
Federal regulator for state licensed branches and agencies
of foreign banks, "^^^ and thereby effectively reverses the
Federal Reserve's former residual supervisory position under
the IBA.
^" Id.
^^^ H.R. Rep. No. 330, supra note 94, at 106, reprinted in
1991 U.S.C. C.A.N, at 1919.
CHAPTER IV. LEGISLATION AFTER THE FBSEA AFFECTING FOREIGN
BANKING IN THE U.S.
A. The Amendments of 1993 to the FBSEA
The Federal Reserve on January 28, 1993 and thereafter
adopted several amendments to the FBSEA to implement its
expanded supervisory role over foreign banks doing business
in the United States. (The amendments of 1993 to the FBSEA
will be referred to as "the Amendments" in this article.)
The Amendments, among other things, modify (1) application
procedures for the establishment of new branches, agencies,
commercial lending companies, and representative offices by
foreign banks;^"^ (2) certain important definitions in the
FBSEA; " (3) the enforcement and termination authority of
the Federal Reserve; '''^^ and (4) the implementation of the
national bank lending limits on state branches and agencies
of foreign banks. ''"^°
It is important to note that the Amendments provide
guidance to foreign banks engaged in strategic planning to
comply with the evolving federal regulatory scheme.
In addition to the foregoing, in an attempt to expedite
the difficult and drawn-out application process necessitated
by the FBSEA, on March 8, 1993, the Federal Reserve issued
^^^ 12 C.F.R. s 211.24 (1994) .
^^^ 12 C.F.R. s 211.21 (1994) .
^^^ 12 C.F.R. s 211.25 (1994) .
^^° 12 C.F.R. s 211.28 (1994)
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revised application processing guidelines/^^ which (1)
require concurrent review by the Federal Reserve and local
Federal Reserve Bank staffs; ^"'^ (2) encourage pre-application
meetings with the Federal Reserve staff by the applicant
foreign bank;-^'^'^ (3) impose time frames for both the
applicant and the Federal Reserve relating to the processing
of the application.'^"^''
1. Amendments to Application
The Federal Reserve has clarified that it views the
comprehensive supervision standard in Section 7 (d) of the
IBA as requiring a regulatory review of an application with
two related yet distinct elements: (1) an inquiry into the
nature and scope of bank supervision by the home country
supervisor and (2) an inquiry into the degree of regulation
and oversight as applied to the applicant foreign bank and
its constituent elements. The first component of the
standard requires the applicant foreign bank to present
information to the Federal Reserve concerning the
organization, operation, and effectiveness of the home
country bank regulator, while the second component requires
information supporting the conclusion that the foreign bank
itself is subject to a degree of supervision that the
Federal Reserve finds sufficient. Because the second
component of the application standard is bank-specific,
^^^ See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
"^ Id.
^" Id.
'^' Id.
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applicants from countries in which similar applications
previously have been approved will be required to show the
same level of supervision as was applicable for an
application previously approved, including identifying the
extent to which the home country applies a consistent level
of supervision to regulated financial institutions . '^^
In regard to application procedures, the Federal
Reserve has elected not to delegate to the local Federal
Reserve banks the authority to approve the first FBSEA
application filed by a foreign bank, but subsequent
applications by a particular foreign bank will be delegated,
provided (1) the subsequent application is for an office
that exercises lesser or equal powers than the preceding
application and (2) no significant supervisory issues are
presented. The requirement that the Federal Reserve itself
make a determination on the first FBSEA application of a
foreign bank enables the Federal Reserve to establish both a
bank-specific record that the foreign bank may rely upon for
subsequent applications and a data base for all subsequent
applications from a particular home country regarding that
country's bank supervisory system.
^"^^ Foreign banks from countries in the process of
developing a comprehensive bank regulatory system could
suffer under the approach adopted by the Federal Reserve,
which appears to view the comprehensive regulatory
requirement as imposing a minimum standard based on
objective criteria being developed by the Federal Reserve.
In those cases in which the home country regulatory scheme
does not meet the FBSEA requirement, the Federal Reserve
suggests that a representative office might constitute an
alternative initial entry vehicle for a foreign bank.
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While the application procedures for branches,
agencies, representative offices, and commercial lending
companies have been enormously complicated by the FBSEA, the
Federal Reserve elected to grant some limited relief to
foreign banks relating to the establishment of certain types
of representative offices. ^^^ First, representative offices
performing back office and similar support services for
existing banking offices of a foreign bank will be subject
to a notice requirement to the Federal Reserve, provided
that the activities of the representative office are limited
to providing support functions relating to the existing
banking functions of the foreign bank.'^^^ Anyway, the
Federal Reserve continues to retain full supervision and
examination authority over such offices. Second, in order
to encourage the establishment of regional administrative
offices to oversee the operations of a foreign bank's
activities, a regional representative office may be
established with forty-five days' prior notice being
provided to the Federal Reserve . '^^^
It is important that a foreign banking organization
focus on those types of actions that trigger the requirement
of an application to the Federal Reserve, which the
Amendments define as the "establishment" of a branch,
agency, representative office, or commercial lending
^^^ 12 C.F.R. s 211.24 (a) (2) (I) (1994) .
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company. These triggering events, some of which are
transactional in nature, are summarized as follows.
1) Opening or Moving an Office
The most straightforward occurrence that requires an
application to the Federal Reserve involves the opening or
relocation of an office of a foreign bank in the United
States. ^^^ In regard to relocation, an application is
required only when an office is being moved from one state
to another.
2) Changing the Status of an Office
The Amendments require an application to the Federal
Reserve whenever the status or functions of an office are
expanded. This includes (1) converting a representative
office into an agency or branch office;'^''" (2) converting an
agency into a branch office; ^^^ (3) converting a federal
branch into a state branch; ^'''^ and (4) converting a federal
agency into a state agency . ^''"^
It should be noted that the Federal Reserve indicated
that its concern was the expansion of powers of an existing
office, and therefore it exempted the conversion of a state
agency or branch to a corresponding federal license.
Similarly, an application is not required if the existing
139 12 C.F.R. s 211.24 (a) (1) (I) (1994)
.
^^° 12 C.F.R. s 211.24 (a) (4) (ii) (1994)
''' Id.
''' Id.
''' Id.
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license of an office is renewed by the appropriate
regulatory authority.^''''
3) Mergers, Acquisitions, and Similar Corporate
Transactions
An application must be made to the Federal Reserve when
a foreign bank acquires an office as a result of a merger,
consolidation, or similar corporate transaction.^''^ (This
includes the acquisition of a foreign bank subsidiary in
which the activities of the subsidiary's offices will
change.) This test appears to be noninclusive in regard to
the nature of the particular corporate transaction that
might result in the acquisition of an office, but rather,
focuses on the ultimate effect of the transaction itself.
There are, however, several types of corporate acquisitions
that either may not require an application or that might
require notice or clarification from the Federal Reserve
whether an application is necessary. First, in the case in
which a foreign bank is acquired, but its operations are
neither merged nor otherwise consolidated, an application is
not required. Rather, the Amendments require that written
notification be provided to the Federal Reserve within ten
^^^ It should be noted that, by its terms, the FBSEA now
limits the activities of state branches and agencies to
those permitted for federal agencies and branches, which
logically should make irrelevant conversions between state
and federal licenses once the Federal Reserve becomes
comfortable with its oversight responsibility. In
recognition of this issue, the Federal Reserve has
requested, as part of the rulemaking relating to the powers
of state agency and branches, public comment on the need for
applications in these conversion situations.
^"^ 12 C.F.R. s 211.24 (a) (3) (I) (1994) .
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days of the change in control. Second, while certain
consolidations and similar reorganizations may technically
be deemed to establish a new office, the Federal Reserve has
indicated that a determination from the Federal Reserve
might be sought to avoid the need for a complete
application/''^
2. Amendments to Definitions
The Amendments adopted several definitions that affect
foreign banks' application for a branch, agency, or
representative office to the Federal Reserve. They are as
follows
:
1) Representative Office
The Federal Reserve modified the definition of
representative office in order to clarify that a
representative office includes any place of business of a
foreign bank, located in any state, that is not a branch,
agency, or subsidiary of the foreign bank.'^''^ The intention
of this definition is to make clear that a foreign bank
electing to conduct business directly in the United States
must conduct its business either through a branch, agency,
or a representative off ice. '^''^ Thus, a representative office
is authorized to conduct those activities permitted by state
law or federal law, provided that the activities are not
activities limited to those that may be performed by a
146 12 C.F.R. s 211.24 (a) (1) (1994) .
^^' 12 C.F.R. s 211.21 (v) (1994) .
^''^ The Federal Reserve indicated that organizing a
subsidiary in order to avoid obtaining the Federal Reserve
approval may result in further regulation to deem certain
subsidiaries to be representative office.
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branch or agency (i.e., deposit-taking functions), in which
case a branch or agency approval must be obtained from the
Federal Reserve. This definition has several significant
impacts for foreign banks. First, the definition includes
any office at which the business of a foreign bank is
directly conducted (other than a branch, agency, or
subsidiary) . This means that certain offices that do not
meet a state law definition of a representative office will
constitute representative offices under the FBSEA, and such
offices must be registered with the Federal Reserve . ^''^
Second, the definition impliedly permits representative
offices to conduct nonbanking activities at those locations,
but prohibits activities to be conducted that are limited to
branches and agencies (i.e., accepting deposits) . ^^°
2) Agency Office
The Amendments adopted the definition of an agency
office as a place of business that may maintain credit
balances, pay checks, or lend money, but, except to the
extent not prohibited by state or federal law, may not
accept deposits from a citizen or resident of the United
States. ^^^ This definition clarifies that an agency office
may, in certain limited circumstances, accept deposits
originating from U.S. sources, including deposits of
nonresident persons and entities as well as interbank and
international banking facility deposits.
''' 12 C.F.R. s 211.24 (a) (2) (I) (1994) .
^^° 12 C.F.R. s 211.24 (d) (1994) .
^^^ 12 C.F.R. s 211.21 (b) (1994) .
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The Federal Reserve also established six minimum
criteria to distinguish between a credit balance and a
deposit, and it stated that an obligation would not be
considered a credit balance unless it is (1) incidental to,
or arising out of, other lawful banking activities of the
agency;'^^^ (2) to serve a specific purpose; ^^"^ (3) not
solicited from the public;^^^ (4) not used to pay routine
operating expenses; ^^^ (5) withdrawn within a reasonable
period of time after the specific purpose has been
accomplished; ^^^ and (6) drawn upon in a manner reasonably
related to the nature and size of the account. '^^^
3) Branch Office
To complete the definitional interrelationship between
a representative office, an agency office, and a branch, the
Amendments define a branch as any place of business of a
foreign bank at which deposits are received that are not the
limited classes of deposits permitted for an agency
office. ^^^ This definition requires, for example, that an
agency office that fails to maintain its credit balances in
conformance with the criteria previously discussed must
apply to the Federal Reserve for branch office approval.
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12 C.F.R. s 211.21 (b) (3) (1994)
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3. Enforcement and Termination Authority
While the Amendments adopt the FBSEA authority to
terminate the activity of a foreign bank in the United
States, of a more important note is recent administrative
enforcement action taken by the Federal Reserve following
the examination of an agency. Certain of the written
agreements entered into between the Federal Reserve and the
examined agency offices are instructive of the view
currently being taken by the Federal Reserve examiners
regarding the examination process, as well as the degree to
which the domestic operations of foreign banks will be
required to comply with U.S. banking standards .'^^^
4. Limitation on Loans
The 7\mendments clarify that a foreign bank must
aggregate all loans to the same borrower by all of its
federal and state offices for purposes of complying with the
national bank lending limitation adopted as part of the
FBSEA. ^^° While it is not free from doubt, it is probable
that the Federal Reserve will require (in a manner similar
to the regulations governing national banks) that one office
of a foreign bank be designated as the lead office
responsible for maintaining records for compliance with the
lending limit.
^^^ See Written Agreement, PT Bank Niaga, Jan. 14, 1993;
Cease and Desist Order, United Mizrahi Bank, Ltd., Sept. 30,
1993; Written Agreement, Banco Boliviano Americana, Oct. 4,
1993.
''° 12 C.F.R. s 211.28 (a) (1994) .
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5. Expedited Application Procedures
As previously noted, the initial exercise by the Federal
Reserve of its application approval authority has resulted
in huge delays for even routine applications by foreign
banks with existing operations in the United States. From a
statutory viewpoint, these delays have been occasioned by
the obligation imposed on the Federal Reserve by the FBSEA
to investigate the nature and scope of the applicant's home
country bank regulatory structure. This obligation has
resulted in both applicants and the Federal Reserve engaging
in extensive correspondence to obtain (and, oftentimes,
translate) information not only regarding the fundamental
bank structure of the home country, but the effectiveness of
the regulatory scheme as applied to the applicant. As
indicated by representatives of the Federal Reserve,
discretionary inquiries undertaken by the Federal Reserve
staff to contact and obtain supervisory concerns from home
country supervisors, as well as to conduct name checks of
key personnel, has further added to a significant regulatory
application logjam. "^^"^
In an effort to partially ameliorate this problem, the
Federal Reserve issued a policy statement that set forth a
practical road map for applicants to expedite their
particular applications. The major components of the
processing guidelines are as follows.
^^^ On June 25, 1993, the Federal Reserve adopted modified
application requirements intended to facilitate the
processing of applications for representative offices of
foreign banks. Citizens National Bank, 79 Fed. Res. Bull.
805 (June 25, 1993)
.
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1) Simultaneous Application Review
The typical Federal Reserve application process entails
sequential review, which means that an application first is
reviewed by staff at the applicant's local Federal Reserve
Bank prior to the application being forwarded to the Federal
Reserve in Washington, D.C. for additional review and
consideration.''^^ This process often results in requests for
additional information by both staffs, thereby significantly
elongating the time frame in which basic application review
takes place.
In an effort to truncate initial staff review,
applications subject to the requirements of the FBSEA will
be reviewed simultaneously by the staffs of the local
Federal Reserve bank and the Federal Reserve. This
simultaneous review will include coordinating requests for
additional information and setting internal deadlines for
accomplishing the same.
2) Encouraging Meetings With Staff Prior to Filing the
Application
Because the FBSEA application process is new and
extremely complicated, the Federal Reserve invites
applicants to meet with the staff of both the local Federal
Reserve Bank and the Federal Reserve prior to filing an
application in order to discuss the nature and content of
the proposed application.^" This initial step in the
^^^ James R. Kraus, Fed Moves to Reduce Delays on Foreign
Bank Application, Am. Banker, Mar. 12, 1993, at 2.
163 See Fed Speeds Up Foreign Bank Application Process Under
FBSEA, 60 Banking Rep. (BNA) 332 (Mar. 15, 1993)
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application process is intended to convey necessary
information between the parties, particularly recent
developments in the evolving application process, in order
to ensure that the application is as detailed and complete
as possible when finally submitted.
3) Time Deadlines for Both the Federal Reserve and
Applicant
While even the most casual observer can conclude that
typical Federal Reserve processing time frames are
unworkable for the FBSEA applications, the Federal Reserve
has adopted several guidelines to expedite application
processing, which involve deadlines for both the applicant
and the Federal Reserve.
In regard to the applicant, the Federal Reserve has
experienced several situations in which requests from the
Federal Reserve for additional information have gone
unanswered for several months, including requests for
information necessary to complete name checks and other
background investigations. Accordingly, the Federal Reserve
has agreed initially to review and request additional
information from the applicant within fifteen days of
receipt of the application, ^^^ whereupon the applicant must
respond within twenty business days with the requested
information. -^^^ The failure to provide the requested
information will usually result in the application being
''' Id.
''' Id.
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deemed informationally incomplete and returned to the
foreign bank.'^^^
In return for expedited responses from an applicant, the
Federal Reserve has undertaken a more formal communications
schedule to inform applicants of the status of applications.
This will include sending a letter at 60 and 120 days
following the receipt of an application informing the
applicant of problems that the Federal Reserve is
experiencing in processing. '^^^
B. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking Act
With the passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking
and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994^^^ (the "Riegle-Neal
Act") on September 29, 1994, Congress has finally enacted
interstate banking reform at the federal level. The Riegle-
Neal Act was named for two lawmakers who retired in the same
year -- Senate Banking Committee Chairman Donald W. Riegle
Jr. (D-Mich) and Rep. Stephen L. Neal (D-N.C), chairman of
the House Banking Subcommittee on Financial Institutions .'^^^
The predominant purpose of the Riegle-Neal Act is to enact
^^^ The response time deadlines the Federal Reserve has
imposed for an application could result in a significant
compliance burden, particularly if the information must be
obtained or verified in the home country. Until the Federal
Reserve becomes comfortable with processing FBSEA
applications, a foreign bank should deem both the
preparation of an application and responding to a request
for additional information to require significant allocation
of resources.
''' Id.
168 Pub. L. No. 103-328 (1994) .
^^^ President Signs Interstate Legislation, 13 No. 19
Banking Pol'y Rep., at 1.
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interstate banking reform at the federal level,
simultaneously it amends a section of the IBA, doing away
with geographic restrictions on interstate operations of
foreign banks. ^'° According to the older legislation,
foreign banks had to choose a home state only if they
controlled a U.S. subsidiary or operated banks that accepted
domestic deposits . ^^^ The Riegle-Neal Act generally enables
domestic and foreign banking organizations to engage in
interstate bank acquisitions and interstate branching by
merger and consolidation. -^^^ In other words, it permits a
foreign bank to establish branches interstate from its head
office instead of requiring a foreign bank to first
establish a U.S. subsidiary bank before it could participate
in interstate banking. Under the Riegle-Neal Act, foreign
banks with U.S. domestic subsidiaries will be able to engage
in interstate operations through those subsidiaries to the
same extent as domestic banks. Interstate operations under
the Riegle-Neal Act include:
a) A bank holding company's acquisition of separately held
banks in a state other than its home state. ^^^
^^° Fed Proposal Lifts Restrictions On Acquisitions By
Foreign Owned Banks, BNA Banking Daily, Dec. 29, 1995.
''' Id.
^^^ Kenneth L. Bachman & Frank R. Borchert III, Interstate
Law May Have Limited Appeal To Foreign Banks, Banking Policy
Report, October 17, 1994, at 1.
''' Id.
52
b) Interstate mergers of insured banks with different home
states, including consolidations of affiliated insured
banks . ^"'
c) Establishment of interstate branches on a de novo basis
or by branch acquisition in states that enact their own
legislation to permit either practice . '^^
In addition, the Riegle-Neal Act allows states, at
their own discretion, to permit de novo branches and branch
acquisitions on a non-discriminatory basis. "^ Foreign bank
subsidiaries are safer for customers because if the parent
company fails, the customer deposits only remain backed by
the capital of the local subsidiary. On the other hand, if a
foreign bank establishes a branch, then the safety and
soundness of the foreign bank is in direct relationship to
the branches - customers' deposits are backed by the capital
of the foreign bank.
Since foreign bank participation in interstate
consolidation was a hot debate in Congress, while permitting
foreign banks to engage in interstate transactions.
Congress, as a compromise, also adopted a series of measures
that may somewhat limit foreign banks' operations .^^^ In
this connection, the Riegle-Neal Act also requires the
FDIC, "under the International Banking Act of 1978, to
ensure that domestic retail deposit activities by state-
''' Id.
''' Id.
''" Id.
^^^ See supra note 155 and the accompanying text
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licensed branches do not give foreign banks an unfair
competitive advantage over U.S. banking organizations."^^®
The rules would restrict the type of deposits under $100,000
that an uninsured state-licensed branch of a foreign bank
could accept. ^^^ This provision is in line with the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
(FDICIA) which held that deposits of less than $100,000 can
only be maintained at insured subsidiaries of a foreign
bank. The IBA prohibits a foreign branch from accepting
deposits in amounts less than $100,000 unless the branch is
insured by the FDIC.^^° However, the FDIC believes that
allowing an uninsured state-licensed foreign bank to accept
deposits of less than $100,000 from a certain class of
customers will not adversely affect domestic banks. For
example, foreign banks should be able to accept small
deposits from customers of the foreign bank with whom they
have extended credit to within the past twelve months.
A final rule on the international operations of U.S.
domestic banks and the operations of federal branches and
agencies of foreign banks in the United States, implementing
provisions of the FBSEA and the Riegle-Neal Act relating to
^^^ FDIC Proposes Foreign Bank Retail Deposit Rules, 14
Banking Policy Report 2, (August 7, 1995)
.
^^^
"Currently FDIC regulations require that any state-
licensed branch engaged in domestic retail deposit activity
must be FDIC insured unless initial deposits of less than
$100,000 are derived solely from certain categories of
depositors not exceeding, on an average daily basis, five
percent of that average of the branches deposits for the
last thirty days of the most recent calendar quarter." Id.
^®° 12 U.S.C. s 3104.
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foreign banks, was adopted^"^ on April 23, 1996. Under the
final rule, foreign bank branches in the United States may
accept initial deposits of less than $100,000 from seven
categories of depositors. Those include:
a) individuals who are neither U.S. citizens nor
residents; ^^^
b) individuals who are residents, but not citizens, of the
United States, who are employed by a foreign bank, business,
or government, or a recognized international organization; '^^"^
c) persons, and immediate family members, to whom the branch
or the foreign bank or its affiliate had extended credit or
provided other non-deposit banking services in the past
year, or with whom the branch or foreign bank has a written
agreement to extend credit or provide those services within
12 months after the date of the initial deposit; ^^^
d) persons who deposit funds in connection with the
transmission of funds; '^^^
e) persons who may deposit funds with Edge corporations,
such as persons engaged in certain international business
activities;^^^
f) foreign business and large U.S. businesses; ^^^ and.
^^^ OCC Adopts Rule on Foreign Banks; Retail Deposits Under
$100,000 Limited, BNA Banking Daily, April 24, 1996.
''' Id,
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g) foreign government units and recognized international
organizations . ^^^
While uninsured branches and agencies of foreign banks
generally cannot take retail deposits under $100,000,
current regulations have permitted an exception for initial
deposit up to 5 percent of branch deposits . ^^"^ The final
rule, in accordance with the Riegle-Neal Act, this so-called
de minimus deposit amount to 1 percent of the branch'
s
average deposits .^^°
''' Id.
^"" Id.
189 OCC Adopts Rule on Foreign Banks, BNA Banking Daily,
Apr. 24, 1996.
''' Id.
CHAPTER V. DAIWA AFFAIR AND U.S. REACTION
The Daiwa Bank Limited ("Daiwa"), a Japan Osaka-
headquartered bank and one of the largest bank in the
world^^^, operated two state-chartered branches in New York
City,^^^ which were licensed to conduct business under New
York state law. The two branches did not have federal
deposit insurance, and were subject to supervision by the
New York State Banking Department under state law and the
Federal Reserve under the IBA, as amended by the FBSEA.'^^^
In addition, Daiwa operated five other branches, seven
agency offices, and 14 representative offices, none of which
had federal deposit insurance . ^^'^ Each of these branches,
agencies, and offices were granted licenses to conduct
business by the 11 states in which they were located and
were jointly supervised by the individual states
respectively and the Federal Reserve. '^^^ Also, Daiwa
^^^ See The Top 200 World Banking Companies , Am. Banker 6,
Vol. 160, No. 144, July 28, 1995. Based on total assets at
year-end 1994, Daiwa was ranked 19th.
^^^ Michael Gruson & Jonathan M. Weldm, Daiwa Bank's Ouster
From the United States: The Aftermath (So Far), 15 No. 4
Banking Pol'y Rep. 1, at 15, Feb. 19, 1996.
^^^ William F. Kroener, III, Testimony of Ricki Heifer,
Chair-federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on Daiwa Bank
and the Supervision of Foreign Banks Operating in the United
States, Before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs of the United States Senate, 935 PLI/Corp 569, at
576, April, 1996.
''' Id.
^" Id.
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operated a U.S. state-chartered non-member bank, the Daiwa
Bank Trust Company ("Daiwa Trust")/ the only insured U.S.
subsidiary of Daiwa. ^^^
A. Daiwa Affair In Brief
The Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan gave a
brief rundown of the key elements of the Daiwa affair in his
congressional testimony : "On September 18, 1995, Daiwa Bank
met with a Federal Reserve representative and reported that
Daiwa' s New York branch had incurred losses of $1.1 billion
from trading activities undertaken by Toshihide Iguchi, a
branch officer, over a period of 11 years. These losses
were not reflected in the books and records of the bank or
in its financial statements, and their existence was
concealed through liquidations of securities held in the
bank' s custody accounts and falsification of its custody
records . "^^^
Daiwa has indicated that, while its senior management
learned about the trading losses at the New York branch on
July 24, 1995, the senior management of Daiwa and its New
York branch directed that those losses be concealed from
U.S. bank regulatory and law enforcement authorities as well
as the public for almost two months and also directed the
continuation of transactions designed to avoid the
disclosure of Daiwa' s losses. ^^^ In addition, the senior
''' Id. at 577
^^^ Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking^ Housing^
and Urban Affairs^ (November 27, 1995) (testimony of Alan
Greenspan, Chairman, FED)
.
''' Id.
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management of the New York branch of Daiwa undertook a
series of actions in 1992 and 1993 designed to deceive bank
examiners regarding Daiwa' s trading activities, including
providing written notice to the Federal Reserve that actions
had been taken to separate the custody and trading functions
at the branch, while continuing to operate without such
controls in place. '^^
In early October, 1995, following the commencement of
governmental investigations and the issuance of joint cease
and desist orders into trading losses incurred by the Daiwa
branch in New York, Daiwa reported that Daiwa Trust incurred
net losses of approximately $97 million as a result of
trading activities, at least some of them unauthorized,
during the approximate period of 1984 through 1987. ^^^ These
trading losses: (1) were not reported on its books and
records; (2) were not reported on the financial statements
of Daiwa Trust; and (3) were concealed from federal and
state examiners and regulatory authorities through a series
of transaction with off-shore entities. In addition, the
senior management of Daiwa and Daiwa Trust participated in
the falsification of records and concealment of those
trading losses. ^°'^
B. Problems Raised by Daiwa Affair
The problems at Daiwa' s New York branch and Daiwa Trust
were of three types: 1) the unauthorized activities of
''' Id.
^°° Id.
''' Id.
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traders, 2) the significant deficiencies internal controls
for monitoring compliance with laws and regulations and
risks, and 3) the long-term, conscious effort by senior
managers to deceive regulators concerning losses stemming
from trading activities .^°^
However, the Federal Reserve, itself, in the report
said that bank examiners missed a number of red flags that
should have alerted them to the scandal, which ultimately
led to the bank's expulsion from the U.S. market. ^°"^
According to the report, the examiners uncovered the
potential conflict of interest between Iguchi's trading
activities and his management of customer assets, however,
the examiners failed to follow up with a more thorough
review of the bank's operations . ^°'' Had the examiners
recognized the red flags and appreciated their significance,
the report said, a more rigorous examination would have been
warranted. ^°^ "Under these circumstances, it is possible --
not certain, but more likely -- that the problem would have
been uncovered earlier," the report said.^°^
^°^ Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions
and Consumer Credit of the Comm. on H. Rep. Banking and
Financial Services (December 5, 1995) (testimony of Alan
Greenspan, Chairman, FED)
.
^°^ D^Ainato Pans Fed^ s Handling of Daiwa; Report Indicates
Examiners Missed 'Red Flags', Banking Daily (BNA) , at 1,
April 16, 1996.
2°" Jd, at 2.
''' Id.
''' Id.
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C. U.S. Reaction
1. Sanctions
In early November of 1995, the Federal Reserve, the New
York State Banking Department, and the FDIC, along with
state bank supervisors from five other states, including
California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Florida and Georgia, ^""^
jointly issued consent orders requiring that Daiwa's banking
operations in the United States, including Daiwa Trust cease
within 90 days.^°^
On the same day, Daiwa was indicted for 24 criminal
offenses which was reduced to 20 charges, ^°^ including
falsifying Daiwa' s books to hide the losses, obstructing the
Federal Reserve and the New York State Banking Department
dating back to at least 1988, failing to report Iguchi's
crimes to law enforcement authorities, the unauthorized sale
of customer securities, and providing false information to
the Federal Reserve about the location of its traders. ^^°
On February 29, 1996, Daiwa, ending months of denials,
pleaded guilty to conspiring to conceal $1.1 billion in
trading losses from U.S. regulations and agreed to pay a
^°^ James R. Kraus, Regulations Order Daiwa to Close U.S.
Operations Series, Am. Banker 32, Vol. 160, No. 213,
November 3, 1995.
^°^ John R. Wilke & Timothy L. O'Brien & Norihiko Shirouzu:
The Federal Reserve Gave Japan's Daiwa Bank Ltd. 90 Days to
Get out of the Country, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1995, at Al
.
^°^ Federal Prosecutors Drop Four Counts from Criminal
Charges Against Daiwa Bank, BNA Banking Daily, Feb. 14,
1996.
''' Id.
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$340 million fine.^'^^ Toshihide Iguchi, the former bond
trader of Daiwa, was sentenced to four years in prison and
ordered to pay nearly $2.6 million in fines and restitution
for concealing $1.1 billion in trading losses at Daiwa. ^^^
In early 1996, Daiwa sold "substantially all" of its U.S.
sets to Sumitomo Bank Ltd. for $3.3 billion, including Daiwa
Trust. ^^^
2. Lawmaker's Reaction
On September 27, nearly a year after Daiwa was kicked
out of the United States, 1996, Senate Banking Committee
Chairman Alfonse D'Amato introduced legislation giving the
Federal Reserve greater power to regulate U.S. operations of
foreign banks. ^^''
Aiming at protecting the U.S. financial system from
shocks such as those rippling around the world from huge
losses at Daiwa Bank or the British investment bank Barings
PLC, the D'Amato bill, the Foreign Bank Enforcement Act,
includes five changes to current legislation:
(1) authority for the Federal Reserve to set conditions for
terminating a foreign bank' s activities in the United
^^^ Daiwa Bank to Pay $340 Million in Plea Bargain over
Coverup Charges, BNA Banking Daily, March 1, 1996.
^^^ Frances A. McMorris & Michael Rapoport, Former Daiwa
Bank Trader Gets Four Years in Jail, Fines for Losses, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 17, 1996, at Bll.
^^^ Timothy L. O'Brien, Daiwa to Sell Assets in U.S. to
Sumitomo for $3.3 Billion, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1996, at
A4.
^^^ Senate D'Amato Introduces Bill as Response to Daiwa,.
Barings Episodes, BNA Banking Daily, Sept. 30, 1996.
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States, including the ability to require the foreign bank to
maintain records of U.S. activities, make its officials
available to U.S. investigators, and to escrow funds in the
United States to meet contingent liabilities after the
foreign bank has left the United States; ^-^^
(2) clarification of federal bank regulators' authority to
remove convicted felons from the banking industry, including
those not actually employed by a bank;^'^^
(3) expansion of the current automatic ban on employment of
those convicted of a crime involving dishonesty, breach of
trust, or money laundering to cover employees of U.S.
branches of foreign banks;^'^^
(4) authority for federal regulators to maintain the
confidentiality of bank exam information obtained from
foreign bank supervisors, ^^^ and
(5) authorization for federal courts to allow disclosure of
grand jury evidence to state bank regulators. Currently,
only federal regulators may obtain this information. ^-^^
''' Id.
''' Id.
''' Id.
''' Id.
''' Id.
CHAPTER VI. Analysis and Comments
The FBSEA has been called the "never again BCCI act."^^°
The FBSEA was widely heralded as the most important piece of
international banking legislation since the passage of the
IBA, the first major piece of federal legislation governing
foreign banks in the U.S.^^^ It has also been vilified as a
hastily written law that no one understands.""" In 1993, the
Federal Reserve adopted new rules for foreign banks in the
form of amendments in order to implement the FBSEA. ""^ The
FBSEA and its amendments will, in all likelihood, govern the
entry of foreign banks into the United States. However, the
FBSEA and its amendments constitutes non-tariff barriers to
foreign banks
.
^^° R. Layne, Fed Tougher on Investments from Abroad, Am.
Banker, April 10, 1992, at 1.
^^^ Pub. L. No. 95-369, 92 Stat. 607 (1978), 12 U.S.C.
Section 3101 et seq. On the IBA generally, see the
symposium issue, "Regulation of Foreign Banks in the United
States," 1980 111. L.F. 1.
^^^ J. Kraus, Foreign Banks Fear Burdens ; Congress Added
U.S. Rules Atop State Laws, Am Banker, December 27, 1991, at
2 (quoting a New York State Banking Department official
saying that "[t]he fact is that the law [FBSEA] was written
in such haste that no one know what it means)
.
^^^ Fed Adopts Final Rule Replacing Interim Regulation on
Foreign Bank Supervision, 60 Banking Rep. (BNA) 1993
(January 25, 1993), and Fed Revises Interim Rule to
Implement Foreign Bank Supervision Under FDICIA, 5 9 Banking
Re. (BNA) 655 (November 9, 1992)
.
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A. Violation of National Treatment
The United States has traditionally espoused a policy
of national treatment with respect to direct foreign
investment/ a policy formally adopted with respect to
international banking under the IBA.^^'' The IBA is the
landmark federal legislation governing the activities of
foreign banks in the U.S., it brings foreign banks under
federal regulation. National treatment is a policy intended
''to provide to the extent possible or appropriate equal
treatment for foreign and domestic banks operating in the
United States. "^^^ ''National treatment accords foreign banks
the opportunity to compete in the U.S. on the same basis as
U.S."^^^ However, national treatment does not demand
identical treatment .^^^ It is permissible to treat foreign
and domestic banks in formally different manners. Instead,
it means that there must be substantive equality of
treatment. Foreign banks must be treated no less favorably
than domestic suppliers. This principle was enshrined in
the IBA as it was initially enacted in 1978.^^^ However,
''' 12 U.S.C. s s 3101-3108(1994). See Conference of state
Bank Supervisors v. Conniver, 715 F.2d 604 (D.C. Cir.1983),
cert, denied, 466 U.S. 927 (discussing national treatment
policy and the IBA)
.
^" H.R. Rep. No. 910, 95th Conga., 2d Sees. 5 (1978)
(describing one of the objectives behind the IBA)
.
^^'° GAO Says Foreign Banks Don't Enjoy Significant
Competitive Advantages, 15 Banking Policy Report 11, April
1, 1996.
''' Id.
See supra note 35 and its accompanying text.
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certain amendments to the IBA made by the FBSEA are
inconsistent with the principle. One example is institution
of an examination fee upon foreign banks as outlined in the
FBSEA. ^^^ Once a Federal Reserve license is obtained and a
foreign bank commences business in the U.S. as a branch,
agency, or representative office, it must pay for its own
periodic examinations. The FBSEA empowers the Federal
Reserve to examine each agency and branch of a foreign bank
and to charge the examined institutions for the costs of the
examinations .^^° The amount to charge for an examination is
calculated by multiplying the number of hours the Federal
Reserve examiners take to examine a foreign bank by an
hourly rate.^^'^ The number of examiner hours is not measured
by recording the actual hours expended on an examination. ^^^
Instead, the Federal Reserve applies a formula based on the
characteristics of the foreign bank, such as asset size and
organizational complexity .^^"^ The hourly rate is
approximately $47, which includes personnel, travel, and
other costs. ^^^ U.S. domestic bank, however, are not
^^^ Rep. Gonzalez Blasts Fed for Failing to Charge Foreign
Banks Examination Fees, 60 Banking Report (BNA) 758, May 24,
1993.
"° 12 U.S.C. s 3105(c) (1) (Sup. IV 1992)
.
^^^ Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Charging for Examinations of U.S. Branches, Agencies, and
Representative Offices of Foreign Banks, 58 Fed. Reg. 239
(codified at 12 C.F.R. pt . 211) (proposed Dec. 15, 1993).
"^ Id.
''' Id.
"^ Id.
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assessed fees for the costs bank examiners incur in
conducting their exams. Congress has reportedly wanted to
start charging fees but the issue is whether examination
fees imposed on foreign banks would be consistent with the
U.S. policy of national treatment .^^^ So far, the Federal
Reserve has not assessed examination fees on foreign banks
for its yearly probe into these banks activities . ^^^
"Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan wrote [House
Banking Chairman] Gonzales saying that a fee for examining
state-licensed foreign bank branches, agencies and
representative offices would violate the principle of
national treatment set forth in the International Banking
Act because state chartered banks are not subject to
examination fees."^''^
According to the national treatment principle, as
mentioned above, foreign banks should be accorded
substantively equal treatment as domestic banks:
By duplicating state regulatory approval
processes and supervision, the FBSEA
^^^ Rep. Gonzalez Blasts Fed for Failing to Charge Foreign
Banks Examination Fees, 60 Banking Report (BNA) 758, May 24,
1993.
^^^ Summary of Riegle/Neal : Community Development and
Financial Institutions Modernization Act (Released hy Senate
Banking Committee 7/25/94), 63 Banking Report (BNA) 178,
August 1, 1994.
"^
"The GAO (General Accounting Office) estimated that the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York's cost for examining
foreign bank operations totaled $5 million in 1992. The
Federal Reserve now estimates that such examination costs at
all Reserve Banks will total $11.7 million." Fed May Offer
Rival Regulatory Reorganization Plan, 13 Banking Policy
Report 2, January 1, 1994.
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ensures that foreign banks will bear a
greater regulatory burden than domestic
banks. In subtle but significant way,
the FBSEA has imposed standards on
foreign banks that are more strict or
comprehensive than those facing domestic
banks. The result is a departure from
the policy of national treatment .^^^
Undermining the principle of national treatment is
prima facie illogical. Increasing the number of
applications that a foreign bank must submit to U.S.
authorities is no guarantee that weak or bad banks will be
filtered out from strong, upstanding banks. ^"^^ To be sure,
the probability of detecting "another BCCI" may increase.
But, this logic would lead to an infinite regulatory burden
-- four approval requirements would be better than three,
and so forth -- and, therefore, an infinitely high non-
tariff barrier.
B. Discrimination
How does the Federal Reserve decide whether to grant a
foreign bank a license to open a branch, agency, or
"^ See Serge Bellanger, Stormy Weather: The FBSEA' s Impact
on Foreign Banks, 25 Bankers Mag. 7, 11 (Nov-Dec. 1992);
James C. Sivon, The Impact of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act on the Supervision and
Regulation of Foreign Banks Operating in the USA, 7
Butterworths J. Int'l Banking & Fin. L. 54 (1992).
^^^ See generally Regulation of Foreign Banks: Hearing
before House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs,
102d Conga., Ist Sees. 16 (1991) (testimony of Alan
Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, acknowledging that problems of secret
ownership of U.S. banks through several trances of nominee
shareholder arrangements may recur in spite of new
legislation, such as the FBSEA)
.
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representative office? As mentioned before,''''^ the most
noteworthy and controversial is the mandatory standard that
a foreign bank be supervised by its home-country bank
regulatory authority on a comprehensive, consolidated basis
Regulators from certain countries are likely to be found
deficient, thus their banks are likely to be excluded from
the U.S. market or have an especially difficult time
entering it. The list of countries whose bank regulators
will not "make the grade" is easy to forecast -- Latin
American, Asian, and African countries, ^"'^ i.e., those from
most LDCs (less developed countries) and NICs (newly
industrialized countries) . ^''^ However, that foreign banks
240 See supra section C, Major Provisions of the FBSEA.
^''^ Fernando A. Capablanca, Making Waves, 50 LatinFinance
TF52, September 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mags
File, at 2 (stating that both larger and smaller Latin
American countries are unlikely to meet the requirement of
comprehensive, consolidated supervision) ; Gary N. Kleiman,
Comment^ An Rx to Spur Global Financial Services, Am.
Banker, August 9, 1993, at 19 (''consolidated oversight rules
embraced last year in the wake of the Bank of Credit and
Commerce International scandal have barred the expansion of
Latin America-based and Asia-based groups, notably in the
United States, where the principles are embodied in the
Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act") ; James R. Kraus,
Fed Approves Foreign-Bank Rules; Program to Control Entry
was Mandated by Congress, Am. Banker, April 3, 1992, at 5
("The regulations are likely to fall most heavily on banks
from developing countries, which may not be subject to
consolidated supervision and where supervision may not be up
to U.S. standards."). See also James R. Kraus, Venezuela
Says New Bank Supervisory Law Satisfies U.S. Requirement,
Am. Banker, November 16, 1993, at 9 (concerning the
enactment of a new Venezuelan bank regulatory law that might
meet the comprehensive, consolidated supervision
requirement)
.
^^^ See United Nations Center on Transnational Corporations,
New Issues for Transnational Cooperation in Transnational
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based in industrialized countries, such as Japan and
countries in the European Community, will have little
difficulty in establishing that these standards for
comprehensive, consolidated supervision are satisfied.
C. Unnecessary Non-tariff Barriers
In addition to the violation of national treatment, the
multiple approvals, increased delays and raised costs
imposed on foreign banks also constitute the non-tariff
barriers for the entry of foreign banks to the U.S. banking
markets
.
1. Multiple Approvals
If a foreign bank wants a physical presence in the U.S.
in any form, either federal or state branch or agency, the
first barrier it will face is the Fed' s licensing
requirement. To get the licenses, a foreign bank must file
applications that meet all statutory and regulatory
requirements
.
No foreign bank can set up a branch or agency without
the prior approval of the Federal Reserve .^''"^ For the first
time in its history, the Federal Reserve is cast in the role
Banking (1992); Steve Lohr, U.N. Study Assails the Way
B.C. C.I. Was Shut by Western Central Banks, N.Y. TIMES,
February 5, 1992, at D7 . The Federal Reserve readily
acknowledges that many countries simply do not exercise
comprehensive, consolidated supervision. See FBSEA
Application Bottleneck Soon Will Disappear^ Atlanta Fed
Chief Says, 60 Banking Rep. (BNA) 275 (March 1, 1993)
(quoting Robert P. Forrestal, President, Federal Bank of
Atlanta, as saying that "in many countries, this concept of
consolidated supervision has not yet taken root")
.
^"^ 12 U.S.C. s 3105(d) (1) (Sup. IV 1992); 12 C.F.R. s
211.24 (a) (1) (A) (1993) . This is an amendment to s 7(d)(1) of
the IBA.
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of a "licensing agency, " with respect to foreign bank
branches and agencies.^'''' The Federal Reserve must now weed
out and deny entry to the U.S. not only "potential BCCIs,"
but also foreign bank applicants that are weakly
capitalized, badly managed, or poorly supervised. ^''^
There are at least three levels of bureaucracy that a
foreign bank must penetrate. Two of the bureaucratic levels
are within the Federal system itself: The Federal Reserve
Bank in the district in which the foreign banks proposes to
operate, and the Federal Reserve in Washington, D.C. Why
two levels of review are needed? Suppose the Federal
Reserve approves virtually all Federal Reserve Bank
application recommendations. Then, why bother with this
"rubber stamp"? If the Federal Reserve has ultimate
decision-making authority, but fails to exercise it in
practice, then its review of applications is superfluous.
Suppose, on the other hand, the Federal Reserve aggressively
^"^ James R. Kraus, N. Y. Regulator to Retain Foreign-Bank
Oversight, Am. Banker, April 22, 1992, at 7 . In a letter to
all state-licensed foreign bank branches and agencies in New
York, Derrick D. Cephas, superintendent. New York State
Banking Department, resolutely declared that "the New York
State Banking Department remains the principal licensing
authority for transnational banks.... The Federal Reserve
is not and, going forward, will not be, a licensing
authority." Id. Nonetheless, the term "licensing" seems
applicable in a broad sense. The Federal Reserve has final
decision-making authority over foreign bank entry.
^''^ Regulation of Foreign Banks: Hearing before House Comm.
on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 102d Conga., 1st
Sees. 67 (1991), reprinted in 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 644, 645
(1991) (prepared statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, indicating
the Federal Reserve intended to prevent weak foreign banks
from entering the U.S.).
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reviews Federal Reserve Bank recommendations and alters a
large percentage of them. Then, why do we still need
Federal Reserve Bank level review? If the Federal Reserve
routinely exercises its decision-making authority, then the
Federal Reserve Bank review is superfluous.
The third level of application review is imposed by the
OCC and state bank regulators. Such requirements existed
before the FBSEA was promulgated and still remain in force.
Under governing structure established by the FBSEA and
its amendments, the dual system of banking regulation is no
longer applicable to foreign banks. A state banking license
is no longer sufficient to operate in the United States.
While U. S . -chartered banks can operate with either state or
federal approval, a foreign bank must obtain the Federal
Reserve approval before it can operate an establishment in
the United States. Foreign banks thus are subject to an
additional layer of federal supervision that U.S. domestic
banks can avoid.
2. Delays
A foreign bank does not simply drop an application to
open a branch or agency in the mail and receive a license
back a few weeks later. A successful application takes up
to two years to process. In virtually every case, the
Federal Reserve returns applications and requests additional
information^^^ and will inquire about all aspects of the
^"^ James R. Kraus, Fed's Delay on Foreign Banks Angers
States^ Am. Banker, February 5, 1993, at 1, hereinafter
Kraus, Fed's Delay.
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world-wide operations of even well-know foreign banks. ^^^
Foreign bank applicants are compelled to prepare a
voluminous amount of detailed information for the Federal
Reserve to sift through. Not surprisingly, until April 1993
-- almost two and a half years after the FBSEA was enacted -
- the Federal Reserve had approved only three foreign bank
applications . ^^*^ There was one application waiting at the
Federal Reserve for 340 days, which did not include the time
waiting at the Federal Reserve Bank.^''^
3. Start-up Cost
In addition to delays, the cost for applying for setting
up a presence has also risen. Before the FBSEA was enacted
and its amendments were promulgated, a foreign bank
typically spent $15,000 to $20,000 in legal fees in
connection with an application to a federal or state
regulator to open an office in the U.S.^^° Since that time,
^''^ Richard Layne, Fed Tougher on Investments from Abroad,
Am. Banker, April 10, 1992, at 1 (including that ''foreign
banks that want to acquire, invest, or expand must be
prepared to answer scores of questions on their worldwide
operations") . As the chairman of National Westminster
Bancorp (the U.S. subsidiary of the major multinational
British bank) remarked, ''BCCI caused us problems.... We
have to explain what the parent company does around the
world when we want to buy three branches in Queens New York
City." Id. (quoting John Tugwell, Chairman, National
Westminster Bancorp)
.
^^^ James R. Kraus, Foreign Banks Face Hurdles, Am. Banker,
April 19, 1993, at 2A; Kraus, Fed's Delay, supra note 246,
at 1; James R. Kraus, A First: Fed Approves Taiwan Banks'
Units, Am. Banker, December 22, 1992, at 10.
^''^ Fed Speeds up Foreign Bank Application Process under
FBSEA, Banking Report (BNA) , March 15, 1993.
"° Kraus, Fed's Delay, supra note 246, at 1.
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the cost has doubled or even tripled. The legal fees have
risen to between $50,000 and $75,000."^ The reason for the
skyrocketing legal fees is obvious: the costs associated
with the duplication of effort in obtaining approval from
the Federal Reserve, as well as the OCC or state bank
regulator.
The FBSEA altered the IBA by adding yet another
requirement for foreign bank operations in the U.S. to
receive deposit insurance. In order to maintain domestic
retail deposit accounts of less than $100,000, which require
deposit insurance protection, a foreign bank must establish
at least one banking subsidiary in the U.S. for that purpose
and obtain deposit insurance for that subsidiary. This
effectively repealed the IBA provisions that allowed U.S.
branches of foreign banks to obtain deposit insurance from
the FDIC. The effect of this provision is limited by a
grandfather rule that allows insured branches that held
retail deposits of less than $100,000 before December 19,
1991 (when the FBSEA was enacted) to remain as branches.
The subsidiary requirement is an extraordinary provision
that represents another non-tariff barrier to foreign bank
entry contained in the FBSEA and its amendments. It means
that if a foreign bank branch established after December 19,
1991, wants to accept insured deposits, it must convert from
a branch to a subsidiary. After that date, new insured
foreign bank branches are not permitted. This requirement
means that foreign banks that seek deposit insurance for
deposits do not have a choice as to corporate form, but in
'"' Id.
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the form of a domestic bank. With the subsidiary
requirement, the foreign banks face the higher cost of
establishing^" and operating a separately capitalized U.S.
subsidiary, thereby making deposit-taking activity in the
U.S. less appealing. Thus, requiring foreign banks to
obtain deposit insurance through subsidiaries forces them to
operate in a less efficient manner. The increased costs of
funding and transactions are another type of non-tariff
barrier that restricts market access to foreign banks.
If the Federal Reserve license were the only licenses
required of foreign banks, then perhaps it would be a
justified and prudent measure. Instead, the license is
unnecessarily duplicative and, thus, in practice, does not
play a particularly important role in protecting interested
parties or safeguarding the financial system. Even Federal
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan suggests that the delays
caused by the Federal Reserve licensing requirement are not
offset by a higher caliber of Federal Reserve review. ^^^
^^^ Branches (and agencies) are more competitive than
subsidiaries. The loan capacity of a subsidiary is always
less than that of a branch because this capacity is based on
the capital of the lending organization. With a branch, the
organization is the entire foreign bank, whereas with a
subsidiary it is that subsidiary standing alone. Branches
(and agencies) and subsidiaries concerns efficiency.
Branches (and agencies) can operate more efficiently than
subsidiaries because of the larger amount of capital that
stands behind branches. They can obtain funds at lower cost
because lenders face less risk in dealing with a branch as
opposed to a subsidiary.
^^^ Letter from Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System to Senator Bob Graham (D.-
Florida)
, January 8, 1993 (stating that "the processing . .
.
of applications has proved to more cumbersome than the Board
expected. . . ")
.
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Clearly, the higher the transaction cost of entering the
U.S. banking market, the more likely foreign banks will be
deterred from the market. This is a restriction on the
supply of foreign bank services. The multiple applications
and approvals, the increased delay and the start-up costs
are manifestations of the unnecessary non-tariff barrier
erected against foreign banks.
CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSION
Implementation of the IBA has been generally
successful. It eliminates the advantages enjoyed by the
foreign banks, treating foreign and domestic banks alike
through enforcing the national treatment, which has proven
fair and durable. Foreign banks in large part have been
able to operate successfully under this umbrella. The FBSEA
and its amendments substantially strengthens and
consolidates the business of supervising foreign bank
operations in the U.S. marketplace. By requiring entering
banks to be subject to consolidated comprehensive home
country supervision, on the one hand, the FBSEA provides a
new measure of safety and soundness to the U.S. banking
market, and on the other hand, this overreaction to BCCI and
other foreign bank scandals starts an era of inhospitability
for foreign banks in the United States. Accordingly, the
past twenty-five years of legislation has swung the pendulum
180 degrees - from state domination in the 1970s to a dual
system in the 1980s to a federal dominated system in the
1990s.
Hopefully, the crimes committed by BCCI and Daiwa are
the exceptions. However, the severe punishments carried out
by the federal government should serve as a warning to other
foreign banks planning to commit fraud in the United States.
Of course, arguing that foreign banks should be allowed to
enter the U.S. with complete freedom would be
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irresponsible.^^'' No one wants another BCCI or another
Daiwa. The unique features of banks, coupled with the aim
of minimizing the likelihood of serious bank fraud, explains
the regulatory interest in foreign banks. But, to believe
that another BCCI or Daiwa lurks behind every tree is
erroneous
.
Although regulations and heightened scrutiny are
necessary, I hope that the regulators will accept that the
foreign banking community is fundamentally sound and should
not be regarded with hostility. Suspicion can only warp the
regulatory process and stifle innovation and growth.
Greater efforts to ensure that the U.S. banking market is
not closed to foreign banks are needed; otherwise, the many
economic benefits brought by foreign banks will be lost. A
reluctance of foreign banks to conduct businesses in the
United States will ultimately harm the United States. The
foreign bank regulations should minimize the number of
unsound foreign banks operating in the United States while
maintaining the IBA' s original standard of national
treatment and allowing open entry to its foreign
counterparts
.
^^^ See, e.g. Memorandum from White House to United States
Trade Representative (December 5, 1993) on Trade Agreements
Resulting from the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, 19-21, 58 Fe . Reg. 67, 263 (December 20, 1993)
-- The Most Comprehensive Round Ever Is Concluded, Focus
(GATT Newsletter), December 1993, at 20. As President
Clinton noted, while pursuing free trade in services "taking
into account legitimate U.S. domestic objectives including,
but not limited to, the protection of legitimate health or
safety, essential security, environmental, consumer or
employment opportunity interests and the law and regulations
in those areas" is also necessary.
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